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ANNEXATION AND THE MID-SIZE
METROPOLIS: NEW INSIGHTS IN THE AGE OF
MOBILE CAPITAL
Christopher J. Tyson*

ABSTRACT
Metropolitan regions are led by their central cities. They want and need to
grow, but the suburban sprawl and municipal fragmentation that growth produces
stand in the way. Fragmentation handicaps the central city’s ability to effectively
coordinate responses to regional issues. Mid-size regions are especially vulnerable
to the effects of fragmentation, as they face unique economic development and
sociological challenges. First, mid-size regions lack many of the assets necessary to
compete globally for mobile capital. Second, social inequality plays out differently
in mid-size regions, which are spatially constrained and have pervasive low-density
land use patterns. Municipal boundaries reflect these divisions and determine who
gets to participate in the redistribution of the community’s resources. Of the many
urban policy options available for addressing these challenges, annexation is both
the most potent and the most controversial. This article explores how the growth
ambitions of mid-size central cities are affected by their respective state annexation
regimes. The article examines annexation battles in Mississippi, Tennessee, and
North Carolina to observe how different annexation regimes help or hinder midsize central cities. Ultimately the article finds that mid-size central cities need
annexation regimes that help them to address social inequality while maximizing
their economic competitiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
Every city wants to be larger. Not just for the sake of being larger, but
because being larger almost always means more people, better employment
opportunities, better lifestyle options, and higher property values. Standing in the
way of municipal land growth, however, is urban sprawl.1 While sprawl relates to
the territorial expansion of the city’s identity, it often occurs outside of a
municipality’s borders. Sprawl outside of a municipality’s borders results both in
the development of unincorporated enclaves within the metropolitan region, as well
as the incorporation of new municipalities on the central city’s fringe. As these
separate and autonomous local government units grow in number, they limit the
central city’s growth options. The metropolitan region becomes fragmented, and
municipal fragmentation can foster provincialism within the various jurisdictions.2
Provincialism often thwarts regional cooperation, and a lack of cooperation
can have grave implications for economic development and social relations
throughout a metropolitan region.3 Metropolitan regions compete with each other
for new businesses and residents.4 They all have specific land use, service delivery,
and resource disparities, however, the effects of which can imperil economic
development for the entire region. These disparities typically correspond with race
and class dynamics in a manner that intensifies the geographic distribution of
privilege and disadvantage. Local governments play a key role in marshaling
regional assets to respond to competitive realities, yet increased fragmentation
makes coordinating response efforts difficult. The more of the region’s land area

1

One of the many definitions for urban sprawl provides that sprawl occurs when metropolitan areas
consume land for urbanization at a faster rate than they add population. See, e.g., WILLIAM FULTON ET
AL., BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, WHO SPRAWLS MOST? HOW GROWTH
PATTERNS DIFFER ACROSS THE U.S. 2–4 (2001). Sprawl has also been described as “unplanned,
uncontrolled, and uncoordinated single use development that does not provide for a functional mix of
uses and/or is not functionally related to surrounding land uses and which variously appears as lowdensity, ribbon or strip, scattered, leapfrog, or isolated development.” John I. Carruthers & Gudmundur
F. Ulfarsson, Fragmentation and Sprawl: Evidence from Interregional Analysis, 33 GROWTH &
CHANGE 312, 314 (2002) (quoting ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., GROWTH MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICES (1995)).
2

See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77–81 (1990); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to the New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2014–15 (2000)
(discussing the consequences of municipal fragmentation within a metropolitan region).
3

See infra notes 110, 118 and accompanying text.

4

See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
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the central city controls, the better its chances of maximizing economic
development throughout the region.5
Mid-size regions are especially vulnerable to the effects of sprawl and intraregional municipal fragmentation. They face unique governance and economic
development obstacles that are often underestimated or outright ignored in broader
considerations of urban policy or local government law.6 Unlike large regions,
most mid-size regions lack the critical mass of competitive credentials necessary
for maximizing their economic development potential.7 This is further complicated
by the realities of increasing global, inter-urban competition for mobile capital.8
Geoeconomic forces are transforming the nature of economic development
and the capital attraction strategies of metropolitan regions.9 Global inter-urban
competition for mobile capital is a defining feature of municipal governance and a
relatively high stakes game for mid-size regions.10 As regional anchors, mid-size
central cities set the tone for their regions’ relative economic competitiveness. They
must therefore be able to exercise leadership in establishing the preconditions for
economic viability and growth. The proliferation of multiple local government
units within a region disperses decision-making power over a range of entities and
interests, complicating regional decision making.
In addition to the impact on economic development efforts, in every
metropolitan region there are sociological dimensions to the meaning and
management of municipal boundaries. Boundaries are powerful social
constructions mapped onto existing landscapes and given the force of law. They

5

See infra note 121 and accompanying text.

6

See infra note 87 and accompanying text.

7

Id.

8

Mobile capital refers to the ability of corporations, firms, investors, and other conglomerations of
private funds to move across national and regional borders in pursuit of higher investment returns. The
problem of mobile capital is borne out by the phenomenon of capital flight, and the law and politics of
local government is constituted by the ever-evolving relationship between cities and business. As local
governments and metropolitan regions position themselves to compete for mobile capital, they
participate in a global competition that pits metropolitan region against metropolitan region. See, e.g.,
Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 421–22
(1990) (discussing the relative mobility of capital in shaping inter-local competition); Richard C.
Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV.
482, 487–88 (2009).
9

See infra note 126 and accompanying text.

10

See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 8, at 488–92.
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determine who gets to participate in the redistribution of the community’s
resources. Race and class stratification is in many ways a result of the formation
and reformation of municipal boundaries. The large metropolitan region is often the
default frame for understanding these dynamics. This stratification takes on
different dimensions, however, in mid-size regions, where different race and class
groups exist in relatively spatially constrained, yet low-density, land use patterns.11
Of the many urban policy options available for addressing these challenges,
annexation is one of the most controversial. Annexation, the process through which
municipalities extend their boundaries to envelop outlying unincorporated areas, is
the most frequently utilized method for boundary adjustment and municipal land
area growth.12 Despite its guiding role in urban policy, annexation is seldom
viewed as an essential component of a comprehensive metropolitan economic
development strategy.13 Municipalities often pursue annexation on an ad hoc basis
for development activity in unincorporated areas that will enhance their tax base,
such as building office parks and shopping centers. Annexation activity originating
out of these situations is different from its inclusion in a broader, comprehensive
economic development strategy.14
A state’s annexation law is an important and often under-appreciated
expression of its land use policy. While there are many drivers of economic
competitiveness and social stratification, land use plays an important role. In the
Brookings Institute Report, Annexation and the Fiscal State of Cities, David Rusk
quantifies the relationship between boundary elasticity and municipal economic
well-being.15 According to Rusk, state annexation regimes that facilitate maximum

11

See infra note 107 and accompanying text.

12

See infra note 65.

13

While some texts on economic development reference municipal boundaries, none explicitly
incorporates boundary expansion as part of a broader economic development strategy. See, e.g., WASH.
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH MANAGEMENT’S MISSING LINK (2002);
CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: MOVING BEYOND THE
OVERALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (1999).
14
Annexation is a broad issue with implications for a range of local government units, related issues,
and core functions. See, e.g., Mary M. Edwards, Understanding the Complexities of Annexation, 23 J.
PLANNING LITERATURE 119 (2008). While this author is aware of the many dimensions and
considerations associated with municipal annexation, this article will focus on the relationship between a
state’s annexation regime and the manner in which it impacts the economic development challenges
faced by mid-size metropolitan regions.
15

DAVID RUSK, BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, ANNEXATION AND THE FISCAL FATE OF
CITIES (2006).
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central city boundary elasticity are likely to enhance the fiscal position and, by
extension, economic competitiveness of their metropolitan regions. This holds
specific relevance for the central cities of mid-size metropolitan regions for which
the consequences of fragmentation and sprawl more acutely affect economic
development and social relations.
The fate of mid-size metropolitan regions is tied in large measure to their
ability to reconcile intra-regional municipal fragmentation with increasing global
inter-urban competition for mobile capital. Annexation battles in several states
illustrate this well. While North Carolina’s annexation laws have recently
undergone substantial change, for more than fifty years the state has had the
nation’s most pro-central city annexation regime. Mississippi, on the other hand,
has seen its largest central city anchor, Jackson, choked by sprawl and stifled by its
relatively thin annexation regime. North Carolina and Mississippi represent
opposite ends of the annexation policy spectrum. Neither is a perfect model. Both
show how, if incorporated into a broader metropolitan economic development plan,
annexation can be a critical tool in boosting the economic competitiveness of midsize metropolitan regions.
Part I of this article reviews the historical development and the sociopolitical
impact of annexation policy. Part II defines and contextualizes the mid-size
metropolis for the purpose of illuminating the economic development and
governance challenges at the core of its identity. Part III explores how the growth
ambitions of Mississippi’s, Tennessee’s, and North Carolina’s mid-size central
cities are affected by their respective annexation regimes. The article concludes by
exploring policy innovations for enhancing the potency of annexation regimes in
states with predominately mid-size metropolitan regions.

PART I:

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION

Scholars in several disciplines have long explored the politics, sociology, and
law of municipal boundary formation and reformation.16 Urban historian Kenneth
Jackson opined: “[W]ithout exception, the adjustment of local boundaries has been
the dominant method of population growth in every American city of

16
See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010);
Amanda K. Baumle et al., Strategic Annexation Under the Voting Rights Act: Racial Dimensions of
Annexation Practices, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 81 (2008); Elizabeth R. Connolly, Bargain
Basement Annexation: How Municipalities Subvert the Intent of North Carolina Annexation Laws, 29
N.C. CENT. L.J. 77 (2006); Edwards, supra note 14; Clayton P. Gillette, Voting with Your Hands: Direct
Democracy in Annexation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 835 (2005); Rex L. Facer, Annexation Activity and State
Law in the United States, 41 URB. AFFAIRS REV. 697 (2006).

ANNEXATION AND THE MID-SIZE METROPOLIS
PAGE | 511

consequence.”17 Annexation regimes are a significant area of state and local
government law affecting the ability of cities to respond to population shifts and
development demands within a metropolitan region. They are also powerful tools
in the quest to control and limit sprawl in America’s metropolitan regions.
Annexation laws are not controlled by the federal government, however, making
the development and application of a broad national standard impossible.18
State annexation policy has evolved considerably over the past century.
Forcible annexation was the predominant doctrine in the states during the
nineteenth century. It ensured that no small territory would be allowed to retard the
development of the metropolitan community.19 As suburban development grew,
state legislatures began redefining the legal concept of a city to include suburbs,
liberalizing municipal incorporation laws, and placing new restrictions on the
abilities of central cities to expand.20
The rise of localism coincided with the rise of city power.21 Many
contemporary notions of the city and city power have their roots in the causes of
the Progressive Era, particularly with regard to municipal government reform.22
Around the turn of the twentieth century, both policy makers and jurists alike were
concerned that with the national government and economy rapidly growing in size,

17

See KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 140
(1985).
18
While annexation law is the province of state government, certain states must have annexations precleared by the United States Justice Department under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
19

See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 147.

20

See Briffault, supra note 8, at 357–64 (discussing the social and demographic changes that influenced
the evolution of the legal classification of suburbs and the manner in which it has limited the ability of
metropolitan region central cities to grow).

21
22

For a definition of “localism,” see infra note 123 and accompanying text.

The Progressive Era in the United States was a period of reform that flourished from the 1890s to the
1920s. While the era is known for its innovative approaches to government and urban policy, the
Progressive Era was also marked by the growth of racism and colonialism. Progressives drew support
primarily from the middle class, and supporters included many lawyers, teachers, physicians, ministers,
and businesspeople. Progressives sought to keep corruption out of politics and many Progressives
successfully exposed and undercut political machines and bosses. Their governmental reform efforts
were focused on waste and the delivery of public services by city and state governments. Their efforts
led to the development of a more structured system and more localized power. Changes were made to
local government to make legal processes, market transactions, bureaucratic administration, and
democracy easier to manage, thus giving birth to municipal administration. See, e.g., STEVEN J. DINER,
A VERY DIFFERENT AGE: AMERICANS OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1998).
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scope, and sophistication, the specter of unregulated and unfettered local power
threatened to create a disastrous maze of conflicting and contradictory local laws,
customs, and regulations that would ultimately frustrate national objectives.23
Conflicts over state and local power were settled in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh.24 In Hunter, the Supreme Court effectively settled the notion that there
is any federally protected right to local self-government and solidified the status of
cities as merely creatures of state law.25 The case and the developments in local

23

See Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1066–67 (1980).

24

207 U.S. 161 (1907).

25

The lack of any substantive right to local self-government is the foundational principal of local
government law and is essential to understanding the state’s role in shaping boundary formation and
reformation policy. See id. at 178–79 (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be
entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are
given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature and
duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be
exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring
governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing
them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract
with the State within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The State, therefore, at its pleasure may
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or
vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally
or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.”); see also
Briffault, supra note 2, at 7–8 (“As a matter of conventional legal theory, the states enjoy complete
hegemony over local governments. Under both federal and state constitutional law, local governments
have no rights against their states. Localities may not assert the contracts clause, the equal protection
clause or the privileges and immunities clause against their state governments. Nor do the residents of
local governments have any inherent right to local self-government: local residents may not assert a
constitutional claim to belong to a particular local government or to have any local government at all.
The formal legal status of a local government in relation to its state is summarized by the three concepts
of ‘creature,’ ‘delegate’ and ‘agent.’ The local government is a creature of the state. It exists only by an
act of the state, and the state, as creator, has plenary power to alter, expand, contract or abolish at will
any or all local units. The local government is a delegate of the state, possessing only those powers the
state has chosen to confer upon it. Absent any specific limitation in the state constitution, the state can
amend, abridge or retract any power it has delegated, much as it can impose new duties or take away old
privileges. The local government is an agent of the state, exercising limited powers at the local level on
behalf of the state. A local government is like a state administrative agency, serving the state in its
narrow area of expertise, but instead of being functional specialists, localities are given jurisdictions
primarily by territory, although certain local units are specialized by function as well as territory.”)
(internal citations and formatting omitted).
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government law that followed marked a considerable shift in the legal conception
of both the city and the suburb in American urban policy.26
Over time, many states have moved away from annexation regimes that
expand central city power and toward systems that subject central cities to
restraints and conditions that safeguard the prerogatives of suburban jurisdictions.
Some states have effectively foreclosed the option for their municipalities to
expand their boundaries. For instance, throughout New England, New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, all territory is divided among a myriad of cities, villages,
boroughs, towns, or townships, and there is no unincorporated land.27 Other states
have annexation laws that are seldom used because the relative strength of their
unincorporated townships and other areas make it difficult for central cities to
annex them.28
The methods for annexation commonly found in state law can be divided into
five categories: popular determination, municipal action (ordinance or resolution),
legislative determination, quasi-legislative determination (regional or statewide
boundary review commissions), and judicial determination. States with popular
determination allow the affected members of the electorate, property owners, area
residents, or some combination thereof to determine if a boundary change will be
enacted. States with municipal determination allow the municipality to unilaterally
extend its boundaries. Most states combine several of these methods to provide
both cities and residents with various alternatives and a range of options to choose
from.29 The result is a great deal of variation across the states regarding municipal
annexation.

26

See, e.g., Kenneth Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the Fate
of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193 (2008) (discussing the historical
relationship between cities and the socioeconomic and political factors fueling the development of the
twentieth-century suburb); Wayne Batchis, Enabling Urban Sprawl: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s
Seminal Zoning Decision Euclid v. Ambler in the 21st Century, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373 (2010)
(discussing Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and its impact on the development of
suburban sprawl and the historical nexus between suburban development and center city decline).
27

See RUSK, supra note 15, at 7.

28

For the relevant annexation regimes within each state under Rusk’s classification, see 65 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-1-1 (2011); IND. CODE § 36-4-3 (2011); IOWA CODE § 368.7 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12519 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 71.014 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-117 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 40-51.2 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-4-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 66.0217 (2011).
29

See, e.g., FRANK D. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM
(Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. ed. 1960); RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 211 (7th ed. 2009).

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 514 | VOLUME 73 (2012)

Many states attach conditions to the annexation process that can severely
inhibit a municipality’s ability to expand. Thirty-four states allow the annexation
process to be initiated by a petition of property owners in the areas to be annexed.30
In nine of these states, annexation can be initiated only by property owner petition,
a limitation that puts central city expansion in the hands of suburban developers
and residents.31 Fourteen states require the approval of the affected voters.32 Eleven
states require that the affected county government must approve any municipal
annexation.33 Twenty-nine states provide for an election in the area to be annexed
at some point in the annexation process.34 Annexations that require the approval of
a majority vote of the residents or property owners in the area proposed for
annexation complicate municipal expansion plans by placing all power over
boundary change in the hands of those of who may have deliberately fled the
central city and are therefore likely opposed to its expansion.
Involuntary annexation provisions allow municipalities to unilaterally expand
their boundaries. Affected landowners often have little or no right to dissent as long
as the annexing body complies with the strict geographical and developmental
criteria and procedures set forth in the statutory requirements.35 States that allow
involuntary annexation include Indiana,36 Kansas,37 Kentucky,38 Nebraska,39
Tennessee,40 and Texas.41
Annexation is controversial and often leads to litigation. Annexation battles
typically involve one of two contexts: when neighboring municipalities are
competing for the same land area or when a municipality seeks to annex land from

30

See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS: A CENSUS 2000 UPDATE 108 (Woodrow Wilson Plaza
ed., 3d ed. 2003).

31

Id.

32

Id. at 108–09.

33

Id.

34

See Edwards, supra note 14, at 124.

35

See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 16, at 82.

36

IND. CODE ANN. § 36-4-3-3 et seq. (2011).

37

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-520(a) et seq. (2011).

38

See KRS § 81.100 et seq. (2012).

39

See NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-117 et seq. (2012).

40

TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-58-111(a) et seq. (2011).

41

See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE § 43.033 et seq. (West 2012).
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its unincorporated environs.42 Those opposing annexations almost always include
the landowners, businesses, and residents of the unincorporated area proposed for
annexation, and sometimes residents of the county in whose borders the area falls.
These groups are the most directly affected by proposed annexations. Annexations
will likely result in a change to their tax liabilities or result in fee increases.
Additionally, newly annexed residents may oppose the city’s political regime.43
Opposition may also reflect the race and class politics of the metropolitan region.
Suburban dwellers have traditionally been white and middle class, with their flight
to the suburbs driven by a mix of factors that, together, have spurred suburban
expansion and defined the modern suburban identity.44
In Cities without Suburbs: The 2000 Census Update, David Rusk makes the
observation that around the middle of the twentieth century, “Washington, Wall
Street, Detroit, Hollywood, and Madison Avenue” introduced the American middle
class to a revision of the American dream that fundamentally reorganized land use
and metropolitan organization and governance.45 The physical landscape of the
metropolitan region and the distribution of neighborhoods, shopping areas,
business districts, prosperity, and poverty are all the cumulative result of specific
federal, state, and local policy decisions that developed from historical events,
social processes, and economic forces. These forces have redefined the look,
experience, and meaning of metropolitan space. They have resulted in the selective
concentration of social activity and employment opportunities in a manner that has
led to social polarization, spatial imbalances, and fragmented, uncoordinated
government.46
In light of this history, urban sprawl cannot be attributed to just the
cumulative impact of population growth, technology, or the lure of the suburbs. It
is not just a rational rejection of city life, city politics, or urbanity. Urban sprawl

42

See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 211.

43

See Edwards, supra note 14, at 127–29.

44

See infra note 48 and accompanying text.

45

See RUSK, supra note 30, at 7.

46

See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 26, at 379–83 (discussing the role of exclusionary zoning in the
development of urban sprawl); Audrey G. McFarlane, Rebuilding the Public-Private City: Regulatory
Taking’s Anti-Subordination Insights for Eminent Domain and Redevelopment, 42 IND. L. REV. 97,
118–34 (2009) (discussing race and class subordination in redevelopment); John A. Powell &
Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished
Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 436–48 (2003) (discussing the race, class, and spatial
forces driving gentrification).
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reflects developments in the socio-cultural construction of the modern American
middle class, the race and class struggles of the twentieth century, the massive
federal subsidization of suburban growth policies, and exclusionary zoning.47 The
confluence of these forces substantially redefined the meaning and experience of
American life in a manner that transformed metropolitan regions by promoting,
provoking, and facilitating an initial wave of white flight and a subsequent wave of
multi-racial middle class flight that has decimated the tax base and urban core of
metropolitan region central cities.48 This flight is quantifiable: in 1950, almost
seventy percent of the population of 168 metropolitan regions lived in 193 central
cities; by 2000, over sixty percent of the population of 331 metropolitan regions
lived in suburbs.49 Over the same period, population density in 157 of those
urbanized areas was effectively cut in half.50
The only central cities that added population during the past five decades
without expanding their boundaries were Miami; San Francisco; Elizabeth and
Patterson, New Jersey; and New York City.51 The states whose annexation regimes
facilitate frequent municipal annexations of substantial landmasses are mostly

47

See RUSK, supra note 30, at 24–25 (discussing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993)) and JACKSON,
supra note 17, at 195–203 (The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which provided low-interest, longterm mortgage loans to financially struggling families created a neighborhood rating system that
“redlined” predominately black neighborhoods, denying loans to families in those areas. The residential
security maps that redlined black neighborhoods for disinvestment were regularly used by private banks
for their lending practices and were embraced by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans
Administration when they were founded in 1937 and 1944, respectively.).
48
For a discussion of the causes and consequences of white suburban flight, see, e.g., Kyle Crowder,
The Racial Context of White Mobility: An Individual-Level Assessment of the White Flight Hypothesis,
29 SOC. SCI. RES. 223 (2000) (presenting research that indicates that the likelihood of Whites leaving a
neighborhood increases significantly with the size of the minority population in the neighborhood and
that Whites are especially likely to leave neighborhoods containing combinations of multiple minority
groups); George C. Galster, White Flight from Racially Integrated Neighborhoods in the 1970s: The
Cleveland Experience, 27 URB. STUD. 385, 391 (1990) (presenting econometric research indicating that
segregationist sentiment was a primary driver in white emigration from racially integrated
neighborhoods); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 25–50 (1996) (discussing the
various factors characterizing the development of an isolated and economically disadvantaged ghetto
underclass); see also generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SUBURBS (1976).
49

RUSK, supra note 30, at 5.

50

Id. at 8.

51

RUSK, supra note 15, at 6.
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found in the nation’s Sun Belt region.52 These states are where annexation activity
has been the most frequent.53 Twenty-seven states have experienced significant
annexation in the past twenty years due to aggressive expansions by their central
cities.54 These twenty-seven states include almost all of the Sun Belt states, where
population growth has been the steadiest and where most of the nation’s growing
mid-sized metropolitan regions are located.55 Their growth has undoubtedly
allowed them to develop the infrastructure, population base, and economic
preconditions necessary to enhance their economic competitiveness.56
The process of annexing territory is part of complicated reality of the meaning
and function of municipal boundaries. Municipal boundaries are deliberate
signifiers of cultural, social, and political identity in a community. They demarcate
who is within and outside of a community and consequently who is entitled to
participate in the redistribution of the community’s wealth through public services
and infrastructure. They reflect the nation’s and the local community’s legacy of
race and class struggles and are as much of a reflection of those identity constructs

52
See RUSK, supra note 15, at App. B (showing hyper-elastic and high-elastic cities almost exclusively
located in sun-belt states, including Arizona, Nevada, Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, New
Mexico, Arkansas, South Carolina, and Alabama).
53

See Colin C. Rice, Factors Contributing to Frequency of Municipal Annexation among Medium-sized
Southern U.S. Cities 49–50 (2008) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, Texas State University-San Marcos),
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/281.

54
Rusk classifies these twenty-seven states as “big box” states. For the relevant regimes under the “big
box” classification, see ALA. CODE § 11-42-1 (2011); ALASKA STAT. § 29.06.040 (2011); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9-471 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-40-201 (2011); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56017 (West
2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-12-107 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 101 (2011); FLA. STAT.
§ 171.011 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-36-1 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-222 (2011); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 81a.005 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:151 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., art. 23a,
§ 19 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-1-27 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-4201 (2011); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 268.570 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-7-1 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160a-45 (2011);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 21-102 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 222.111 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-3-110,
repealed by An Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina 2011 N.C. SESS.
LAWS 396; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-102 (2011); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43.001 (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 10-2-401.5 (West 2011); W.VA. CODE § 8-6-1 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-401
(2011).
55
A survey of the top 366 metropolitan regions in the United States with populations of between one
half million and two million reveals that the majority of the areas are located in the South, Western
Plains, and West Coast states. They developed primarily after the advent of the automobile and, in many
cases, after the development of the interstate highway system. See infra note 79.
56

Annexation served as the primary method of boundary growth for many metropolitan regions in the
Sun Belt including: Houston, TX; Dallas, TX; San Antonio, TX; Phoenix, AZ. See Gerald E. Frug,
Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1766–73 (2002) (discussing annexation as a
method of city building).
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as racial and socio-economic classifications themselves.57 Scholars have found that
the more a region is fragmented into multiple governments or municipal identities,
the more racially and economically segregated its housing market is and the slower
its rate of regional economic growth.58 Intra-regional fragmentation both originates
from and exacerbates existing social stratification and weak economic growth
profiles.
Past motives for annexation have often intentionally served to reproduce
preceding race and class inequalities. Annexations have, in many instances, been
influenced by racial motives, carving metropolitan regions into racially and
socioeconomically defined local government units.59 Municipal under-bounding—
annexation practices in which cities grow around or away from low-income
minority communities in an effort to exclude them from municipal services and
curtail their voting rights—has occurred in a number of states and is currently
being challenged in the courts.60

57

Numerous scholars have documented the lineage and effects of America’s race- and class-conscious
urban public policy, its relationship to the decline of central cities and the development and expansion of
the modern American suburb, and the challenges it presents for the future organization of metropolitan
regional politics and economic development. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 935–37 (discussing
the history of race and class influences on boundary construction); Cashin, supra note 2, at 2027–33
(discussing New Regionalism and the impact of local power in the reproduction of regional race, class
and resource allocation disparities); Stahl, supra note 26 (discussing the class consciousness associated
with suburban development and its relationship to zoning and notions of local autonomy in local
government law).
58

See RUSK, supra note 15, at 2 (citing DAVID Y. MILLER, THE REGIONAL GOVERNING OF
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 126–28 (2002)).
59
See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 16 (discussing different theories and approaches to understanding the
methodology of annexation and specifically promoting concurrent majorities as a method for conducting
annexations); Anderson, supra note 16, at 937–41 (discussing municipal under-bounding as a
motivation for annexation and as a reflection of the race and class dimensions of municipal boundary
construction); Baumle et al., supra note 16 (discussing the role of annexation in diluting the weight of
the votes of individuals who were in the city boundaries prior to annexation).
60

See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 940. In Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio found, on a motion for summary judgment, that a jury could
conclude that the city’s reasons for not providing public water to a group of African-American residents
was based on pre-textual racial discrimination. 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 498 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In
Committee Concerning Community Improvement v. City of Modesto, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California dismissed discrimination claims asserted by residents of a Latino
community and two civic groups based on a lack of public service provisions from the city of Modesto
California on a motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in regard to
plaintiffs’ claims under a Master Tax Sharing Agreement and the Fair Housing Act. The Ninth Circuit
also reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ state law claims as well as the district court’s
award of costs to the defendants. 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The case is currently on remand in the
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Various scholars’ calls for increased annexation to address municipal underbounding reflect the negative consequences of fragmentation for historically
marginalized communities and the risks posed by annexation for community
residents.61 Because of statutory requirements and local government practice,
proposed annexations must always consider the fiscal impact of a boundary
expansion.62 This analysis requires weighing the proposed annexation’s service
costs and revenue benefits. This utilitarian approach can mask race and class
animus, ultimately disadvantaging lower income or minority unincorporated areas
that lack an attractive property or retail tax base.63
Race and class bias in annexation reflect deeper conflicts located at the
intersection of property rights and redistribution. Just as private property
boundaries grant the individual the right to exclude others from the bundle of rights
and social, political, and economic benefits tied to private property, city boundaries
also serve an exclusionary function by determining who gets to participate in the
redistribution of a community’s resources. When applied to the role of municipal
boundaries in shaping notions of community, the exclusionary features of private
property ownership are elevated as the essential features worthy of attention and
protection. This leads to a crisis of political discourse where notions of private
property rights are expressed through the formation and reformation of municipal
boundaries.
Frank Sengstock began his 1960 book, Annexation: A Solution to the
Metropolitan Problem, with the contention that “[t]he outstanding demographic
characteristic of the twentieth century United States is the intensive development of
metropolitan areas unrestrained by local political boundaries.”64 As the twenty-first
century unfolds, the implications of Sengstock’s observations are clear in the land

Eastern District of California and undergoing pre-trial preparation. See Comm. Concerning Cmty.
Improvement v. City of Modesto, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13774 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
61

See Anderson, supra note 16, at 938–42.

62

See Edwards, supra note 14, at 127–29.

63

See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 944–59; Connolly, supra note 16, at 82–85 (discussing the
selective annexation of wealthy areas and the exclusion of poorer areas with high minority populations
in recent North Carolina annexation cases); Edwards, supra note 14, at 123 (citing D. Andrew Austin,
Politics vs. Economics: Evidence from Municipal Annexation, 45 J. URB. ECON. 501 (1999) (discussing
empirical analysis that suggests that the fiscal motive of capturing additional tax base did not necessarily
drive annexation decisions and that, while decision-makers do not necessarily pick and choose amongst
census tracts to minimize nonwhites included in an annexation, results do show that decision-makers
used annexation to increase the proportion of white voters and dilute minority voting power)).

64

SENGSTOCK, supra note 29, at 1.
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use and demographic characteristics of American metropolitan regions. Annexation
remains the dominant driver of municipal expansion.65 A half century of suburban
growth politics, however, has undermined the public’s understanding of
annexation.66 Annexation is now widely perceived as a threat to individual liberty
and autonomous self-government, pitting metropolitan region residents against
metropolitan region central city governments.67
A more useful frame for conceptualizing annexation policy recognizes its
potential to both strengthen regional economic development efforts and curb the
continued growth in race and class stratification. This potential is even greater for
mid-size metropolitan regions. These regions face unique economic development
challenges that arise out of a fundamentally distinct set of historical and urban
development realities that separate them from large metropolitan regions.68 While
large metropolitan regions have many tools to lure and retain mobile capital, midsize metropolitan regions typically have less leverage and therefore must reconsider
central city expansion and the organization of metropolitan governance through
annexation.

PART II: THE MID-SIZE METROPOLIS AND THE ANNEXATION
IMPERATIVE
In order to fully comprehend annexation’s potential for bolstering the
economic competitiveness of mid-size regions, it is necessary to investigate the
relationship between boundary elasticity and economic competitiveness. First, it is
necessary to define exactly what constitutes a mid-size metropolitan region and
how it differs from its larger counterparts. This examination must consider the
relatively diminished competitive capacity of mid-size regions in the context of the

65
Boundary expansion was the largest driver of municipal expansion in the second half of the twentieth
century, with almost four-fifths of 521 central cities expanding their boundaries by ten percent or more
between 1950 and 2000. For the decade between 1970 and 1979, municipalities undertook over 61,000
annexations and about the same number for the fifteen-year period from 1990 to 2005. Edwards, supra
note 14, at 119. During the 1990s, 348 of 400 central cities that could annex property did. RUSK, supra
note 30, at 108.
66

See Briffault, supra note 8, at 357–66.

67

Whether or not pro-municipality annexation policies are inherently oppositional to individual property
rights is a topic that deserves a more robust treatment than this article is concerned with. See, e.g.,
Gillette, supra note 16; RUSK, supra note 30, at 108–10 (arguing that annexation laws have an impact
on a city’s flexibility); Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247,
250, 258–71 (1992) (arguing that involuntary annexation power is necessary for all municipal
government).
68

See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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ever-intensifying pressures on metropolitan capital attraction efforts. Lastly, this
examination must explore the specific challenges mid-size regions face in resolving
global inter-urban competition with their historically low level or lack of
participation in that competition.

A.

Metropolitanization and Defining the Mid-Size Metropolis

All cities are not created equal, and mid-size metropolitan regions receive
scant attention in urban policy analysis. Few scholars have explored the
distinctiveness of mid-size metropolitan regions or the substantive policy
considerations that emanate from that distinctiveness.69 Mid-size metropolitan
regions face many of the same growth and global competitiveness challenges as
their larger counterparts, yet generally with less intensity and fewer available
resources.70 In most cases they lack the image, economic and population diversity,
and the real and perceived quality of life advantages that large urban regions have
in abundance.71
Large metropolitan regions are the dominant frame of reference for
discussions of metropolitanization, urban complexity, and urban policy innovation.
They are the conceptual center from which most urban-related knowledge is
developed and critiqued.72 Large metropolitan central cities are internationally
known for their distinct identities, histories, architecture, and culture. They are
destinations that leverage their scale to attract and develop a range of resources that

69

The scholarship on mid-size cities and metropolitan regions reveals varying definitions of “mid-size.”
There is a broad recognition in the scholarship of the mid-size city/region’s largely ignored and
undervalued distinctiveness relative to its larger counterparts and the general lack of attention this has
received in scholarship. See generally Pierre Filion & Trudi Bunting, Exploring Policy Implications of
Metropolitan Size: Accounting for the Mid-Size Urban Area, in GOVERNING METROPOLISES: PROFILES
OF ISSUES AND EXPERIMENTS ON FOUR CONTINENTS 87 (Jean-Pierre Collin & Mélanie Robertson eds.,
2007); Trudi Bunting et al., Density, Size, Dispersion: Towards Understanding the Structural Dynamics
of Mid-Size Cities, 16 CANADIAN J. URB. RES. 27, 46 (2007) (“Mid-size cities suffer from a scarcity of
planning models suited to their particular circumstances, in part because there has been little recognition
of their distinctive status.”).
70
For a definition of mid-size metropolitan regions and large metropolitan regions, see infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
71

Ethnic and racial diversity is primarily prevalent in large metropolitan areas. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 31 tbl. 23 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0023.pdf.
72

See generally NEAL R. PEIRCE, CITISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE
WORLD (1993). See also Filion & Bunting, supra note 69, at 106 (discussing a ten-year survey from the
Journal of the American Planning Association that revealed that a majority of the cities cited belonged
to metropolitan regions with populations greater than one million).
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contribute to their quality of life and livability. In addition to physical scale, they
have the advantage of symbolic scale—the scale of history and cultural narrative.
They are repositories of urban history, the impact and import of which stretches far
beyond their boundaries.
Large metropolitan regions also have a concentration of business and industry
and the magnetic draw of a diverse, dynamic, and youthful population. Their
geographic position and climate profile, historic patterns in the development of
interstate commerce and transportation systems and embedded cultural economies,
and their symbolic significance within larger narratives of community and identity
make them well positioned to satisfy the tastes and preferences of twenty-first
century life.73
New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and others have welldeveloped cultural identities that serve as powerful leverage for the economic
development aims of their metropolitan regions.74 Their relative concentration of
population, culture, firms, and infrastructure validate their position as global cities
and make them magnets for global firms seeking durable preconditions for
economic growth.75 These assets have developed over time and amount to legacy
factors that endow large metropolitan regions with a critical mass of competitive
credentials. These credentials serve as powerful leverage for their competitive
positioning. Ultimately, large metropolitan regions have many options for
reconciling the ever-unfolding dynamics of inter-urban competition for mobile
capital with fragmentation and the challenges of metropolitan economic
development coordination.
Given these observations, the impact of intra-regional fragmentation takes on
a different character in mid-size regions than in large regions.76 As municipalities

73

See, e.g., Mario Polèse, Why Big Cities Matter More than Ever: Seven Reasons, 20 CITY J., No. 4,
2010, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_4_big-cities.html.

74
The development of these cultural identities are deliberate and are part of the way in which cities and
metropolitan regions market and promote themselves, primarily for tourism, which presents
considerable revenue-generating opportunities for municipalities and their businesses. These efforts are
known as “place branding.” Place branding “refers to the broad set of efforts by country, regional and
city governments, and by industry groups, aimed at marketing the places and sectors they represent” for
the purpose of “attract[ing] or retain[ing] factors of development and generally position[ing] the place
for [more] advantage[ous] domestic[] and international[] [positioning] in economic, political and social
terms.” Nicolas Papadopoulos, Place Branding: Evolution, Meaning and Implications, 1 PLACE
BRANDING 36, 36–37 (2004).
75
76

See generally Erla Zwingle, Megacities, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 2002, at 70.

See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 8. Briffault discusses how the mobility of people in a multiplicity of
localities in a metropolitan region can erode the capacity of most cities to undertake new programs that
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of all sizes wrestle with crumbling infrastructure, unfunded pension liabilities, and
tax bases diminished by decades of suburban flight, the physical, economic, and
symbolic advantages of large urban regions can tip the scales of relative success
and survival. These challenges are magnified for mid-size regions relative to their
capacity for competing for mobile capital.
Mid-size metropolitan regions often do not possess the same status, cultural
profile, economic base, and critical mass of legacy factors as large metropolitan
regions. They often lack the leverage to compete in an increasingly high-stakes
inter-urban or inter-municipal competition for mobile capital.77 The unique
challenges that stem from their economic structure, urban form, built environment,
quality of life, and governance are of sufficient magnitude as to require separate
consideration in urban studies and in local government law.
There are various methods of defining what qualifies as a mid-size
metropolitan region, and it is possible to overstate the importance of size, given
that metropolitan regions confront many of the challenges that, regardless of scale,
require the same types of skills and resources to address.78 This author’s definition
of a mid-size metropolitan region focuses on those regions in the United States
with populations between one half million and two million. Metropolitan regions
within this band are distinctly different from regions with populations less than one
half million or those with more than two million.79

would impose costs on already strained local budgets. Additionally, the expansion of public services
will likely be perceived to benefit the poor, racial minorities or municipal workers at the expense of
higher tax-paying individuals and businesses. In mid-size cities, the combination of higher race and
class polarization and relatively undeveloped economic bases only exacerbates the dynamics Briffault
describes.
77

See id.

78

Various studies offer customized definitions of what constitutes a mid-size metropolitan region.
Methods differ depending upon the objective of a particular study. See, e.g., Filion & Bunting, supra
note 69, at 88–89 (defining mid-size as between 100,000 and 500,000).
79

Metropolitan regions with populations less than one half million tend to consist of small cities and
towns, with smaller satellite towns comprising a total metropolitan region. These metropolitan regions
include those of Spokane, Washington; Flint, Michigan; Shreveport, Louisiana; Erie, Pennsylvania;
Charlottesville, Virginia; and Santa Fe, New Mexico. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 366
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/metro. Metropolitan regions with populations greater than two
million tend to consist of large, symbolic, well-branded metropolitan regions that, because of their scale
and legacy factors, have a wide diversity of people and firms. These regions include those of New York,
New York; Houston, Texas; Washington, DC; Denver, Colorado; and Cincinnati, Ohio. For reference,
the April 1, 2010, update of the United States Office of Management and Budget’s ranking of the top
366 MSAs lists twenty-nine metropolitan regions with populations of more than two million,
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The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has developed
and manages an index of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that ranks
metropolitan regions according to population size and gives definition to the
municipalities and jurisdictions that make up each metropolitan statistical area.80
This ranking provides the best baseline for the concerns of this article, specifically
in defining what constitutes a mid-size metropolitan region.
While population numbers are central to this article’s consideration of midsize metropolitan regions, population alone is insufficient to understand the
differences between mid-size and large metropolitan regions. Density is one of the
key metrics for understanding the spatial relationships of cities and metropolitan
regions.81 For the majority of mid-size central cities, densities have never been
high, and their overall development is characterized by low-density spatial forms
that are relatively constant across traditional downtown areas and suburban areas
alike. The land use and transportation patterns of mid-size metropolitan regions
generally follow low-density, decentralized, automobile-oriented land use
patterns.82

representing the top eight percent in number and the top fifty-two percent in population of the 366
MSAs. MSAs ranked numbers 30 to 102 fit this definition of mid-size, comprising twenty-six percent of
the population of the 366 MSAs. The Las Vegas, Nevada, MSA ranks 30th with a population of
1,951,269. The Durham-Chapel Hill, North Carolina, MSA ranks 102nd with a population of 504,357.
This author appreciates that a mid-size metropolitan region classification based solely on a
region’s population may overstate the role that population size plays in determining the economic
competitiveness of a given metropolitan region. For instance, both New Orleans, Louisiana, and Las
Vegas, Nevada, fall within this author’s definition of mid-size metropolitan regions. These areas
arguably possess many of the same legacy credentials that larger population centers do, specifically in
terms of brand capital and external recognition. While the classification used herein presents a higher
floor and ceiling for the definition of “mid-size metropolitan region” than has been used in other studies,
the emergence of global cities and the regional considerations at the core of the arguments presented
herein require a definition of “mid-size metropolitan region” that reflects global realities, specifically
with regards to the rise of global cities and global inter-urban competition.
80
The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines a Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) as a Core Based Statistical Area having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more
population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the
core as measured by commuting ties. The OMB has defined 366 MSAs for the United States as of
March 29, 2010. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79.
81
82

See FULTON ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4.

Because of the dearth of substantive research focused on mid-size metropolitan areas, this author
relies on personal observations. For a discussion of the relationship between density, land use, and the
automobile, see generally Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable
Development in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Middle Landscape, 11
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26 (2003); Filion & Bunting, supra note 69.
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The mid-size region is defined by the relative pervasiveness of the lowdensity form.83 Mid-size regions are likely at a disadvantage to their larger, denser
counterparts because they lack the dense urban form dynamics that are endemic to
places high in economic development activity. These more dense urban forms and
land use patterns can achieve greater economies of scale by reducing the per capita
costs of service delivery and infrastructure development.84
Most mid-size regions developed in the twentieth century. Early in the
twentieth century, several developments emerged that would shape land use,
zoning, and the politics of boundary formation and reformation for the entirety of
the twentieth century. Two of the most significant developments were the
emergence of the automobile and intense race and class strife.85 These dynamics
produced specific land use patterns that shaped mid-size regions differently than
older, larger regions. The resulting land use dynamics are characterized by multiple
dispersed activity nodes across a relatively low-density built environment. This has,
in some cases, produced irregular land uses and correspondingly irregular land
values. These dynamics complicate the physical proximity necessary for the type of
market exchanges that drive economic development in urban centers.86
One key distinction of the mid-size region is the relative lack of activity in the
central city core.87 As a result of the relative lack of economic, social, and cultural
activity occurring in their downtowns, mid-size regions rarely have well-developed
inner-city land use and transportation dynamics that allow for high-density housing
and commercial development arrangements on a meaningful scale.88 Downtown
stabilization and revitalization largely depends on the presence of an effective and

83

See, e.g., Bunting et al., supra note 69, at 29–30.

84

See, e.g., Jan K. Brueckner, Urban Sprawl: Diagnosis and Remedies, 23 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV.
160, 166–67 (2000) (discussing market failure in the context of urban sprawl through the failure to fully
account for the infrastructure costs of new development).

85

See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating an Alabama law redefining the
municipal limits of Tuskegee upon a finding that the boundary redefinition was motivated by a desire to
disenfranchise black citizens); Cashin, supra note 2, at 1993 (“By delegating nearly complete authority
to control land use to the lowest incorporated governmental units, state governments have created a
social, fiscal, and political environment in which suburban jurisdictions are rationally motivated to use
highly exclusionary zoning and developmental policies, and homogeneous localities can give effect to
their worst biases.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
86

See Filion & Bunting, supra note 69, at 90–91.

87

See Bunting et al., supra note 69, at 41–42.

88

See id. at 41–46.
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heavily used transit system, a major employment cluster, a dense inner city, and
tourist appeal—traits usually lacking in mid-size regions.89
Land use and transportation networks characterized by core area depletion
and expansive suburban sprawl impact the economic development profile of midsize regions in a manner markedly different than larger, older, denser, and more
diverse population centers.90 Consequently, mid-size metropolitan regions
complicate prevailing notions of what constitutes the urban and the suburban.
Prevailing stereotypes of urban and suburban development most commonly
associated with large regions are insufficient when applied to mid-size metropolitan
development patterns and land uses. Mid-size regions are typically less dense
throughout their regions, while large urban regions typically have dense central
cities and less dense suburban communities. Therefore, mid-size regions do not
easily fit into the traditional city/suburb framework that is the focus of most
metropolitan governance studies.91
For many mid-size regions, particularly those in the Sun Belt region, the
majority of the infrastructure development and land use decisions were made after
the advent of the automobile and interstate system.92 When President Dwight
Eisenhower signed the Federal Highway Act of 1956,93 which authorized the
funding of the interstate highway system and consequently accelerated the
development of suburban communities on the periphery of the nation’s major
cities, mid-size cities like Memphis, Tennessee, and Raleigh, North Carolina, were
considerably smaller than they are today.94 Their development patterns and spatial

89

See Filion & Bunting, supra note 69.

90

See Bunting et al., supra note 69, at 46–47.

91

U.S. cities overall do not rank high in population density when considered among the ranks of
emerging global cities. Los Angeles, California (the city proper, as opposed to the metropolitan region)
is the country’s most dense city with a 2007 population of 11,789,000 over 2684 square miles, or 4392
people per square mile. This is unremarkable when compared to the world’s most dense city, Mumbai,
India, which has 47,833 people per square mile. New York, on the other hand, is less dense than Los
Angeles with 3299 people per square mile. In comparison to Los Angeles, U.S. cities located in mid-size
metropolitan regions—regions between two million and one half million in population—have density
numbers that range from the unusually high 3173 people per square mile in New Orleans, Louisiana to
the more common 769 people per square mile in Knoxville, Tennessee. The Largest Cities in the World
by Population Density, CITY MAYORS (Jan. 6, 2007), www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-citiesdensity-125.html (statistics used in this work reflect a conversion from kilometers to miles).
92

See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 29.

93

Pub. L. No. 84–627, 70 Stat. 374.

94

See World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, U.N. DEPARTMENT ECON. AND SOC. AFF.,
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Documentation/publications.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
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arrangements therefore mirrored a more suburban form, even in the core of their
central cities.
Because mid-size regions are generally less dense than larger regions, their
residents’ motivations for moving within the region may differ from those of larger
regions. For instance, in large metropolitan regions, the urban core usually contains
dense development patterns that include multi-family complexes, row house
developments, and other small-lot, single-family dwellings. These land-use
arrangements do not allow for an abundance of private land and, consequently,
outdoor recreational activities are usually relegated to public parks and other public
spaces.
Given the pervasiveness of low-density development patterns in mid-size
central cities, it is possible that movement within mid-size regions is spurred less
by a desire for more space and more by a desire to associate or disassociate with
groups depending upon one’s social position. This desire is often reflected in the
local politics of race, class, and public schools—a discourse especially relevant for
understanding social divisions in mid-size regions.95 A determined cohort of
residents moving to peripheral areas adjacent to the municipal and school district
boundaries could eventually develop the critical mass necessary to support their
own autonomous entities.96 When these settlements form, they often are amenable
to higher property taxes to support their own school district and government
structures, indicating that their objection to being in the central city boundaries may
not be higher taxes, but rather the redistribution of their tax dollars to support
infrastructure and services for disfavored groups.97
Mid-size regions and large regions share the effects of metropolitanization on
their land use patterns. Metropolitanization is the process by which a central city
evolves to become a component of a larger regional entity that includes outside
environs—suburbs, exurbs, and surrounding rural areas—that are tied to the central
city by employment, commerce, mass communications, economic interdependence,
and cultural and identity ties.98 Metropolitanization in the United States is largely
the result of early twentieth-century social and political alignments and related
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See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A
Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353 (2005).
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See id.

98
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economic developments that resulted in the geographic expansion of social,
economic, and cultural life from the central city core.
As a consequence of metropolitanization, people no longer live their daily
lives wholly in individual cities and towns or in singular municipal units. Eightfour percent of Americans now live in a metropolitan region.99 Fifty-eight percent
of the workers in metropolitan regions commute to jobs in a city or town different
from the one in which they live but still within their metropolitan region.100
Seventy-nine percent of metropolitan region residents who move choose another
location in the same metropolitan region. Residents of metropolitan regions may
live within separate geographic and political sub-units of the broader metropolitan
region yet shop in different parts of metropolitan regions, receive “local” media
from metro-wide newspapers and television stations, and root for sports teams and
visit cultural institutions that represent and service an entire metropolitan region.
Metropolitan regions represent the critical geographic lens through which it is
possible to define and critique contemporary American society.101 They provide a
window into the impact of geoeconomic realignments that have focused economic
matters away from nation-states and towards metropolitan regions or, as they have
been termed by some scholars, “citistates.”102 For at least the past two decades,
urban research scholars have understood that American central cities are not only
competing with their suburbs but also with metropolitan regional economies all
over the globe.103
Metropolitan regions are the dominant political and economic units through
which the capital attraction motives of local governments are expressed. They are
commonly identified by their central city anchors. For instance, the Los AngelesLong Beach-Santa Ana, California, MSA is commonly known as Los Angeles.104
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Austin Turner, The Future of Urban America in a Global Economy, 62 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, Spring
1996, at 157.
104

See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79; U.S. Census Bureau, Metropolitan and
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Employment growth is essential to metropolitan economic well-being; therefore,
capital attraction is increasingly the primary focus of metropolitan economic
development efforts.105 The central city of a metropolitan region—the largest or
most commonly identified city in the region—must be healthy, vibrant, and ripe for
economic possibility if the region is to prosper. Many of those central cities—
particularly those anchoring mid-size regions—have spent the past many decades
contending with ever-increasing patterns of out-migration and suburbanization that
have sucked people, firms, livelihoods, and tax revenue out of central cities and
displaced them throughout the region.
The mid-size region traditionally has offered few options for meaningful outmigration to developed areas not yet under the control of the central city
government. Given the relatively thin economic base and historically low growth
rates of many of these communities, suburban growth is often slow and sparse,
with many areas retaining rural characteristics as they slowly develop a suburban
identity.106 The lack of worthwhile escape options colors the approach to managing
social hierarchy. These dynamics impact the social construction of place and a
community’s determinations of what constitutes favored and disfavored identity
within the metropolitan region.
Notions of favored and disfavored identity—as typically expressed in race
and class struggles—are inextricably connected to commonly held beliefs about the
bundle of rights associated with private property as well as the social construction
of municipal boundaries.107 They are deeply intertwined with current trends in
urban redevelopment and its over-focus on the gentrification of urban space to
create amenities and privatized spaces for the affluent.108 These trends often result

the metropolitan area). For an explanation of the standards used to determine how metropolitan and
micropolitan statistical areas are defined, see 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and
Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,246 (June 28, 2010).
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Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 338–39 (2010).
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See Filion & Bunting, supra note 69, at 87–114.
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See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713–14 (1993)
(discussing whiteness as treasured property in a society structured on racial caste and how, over time,
the benefits and expectations associated with the privileges of whiteness have been affirmed, legitimated
and protected by the law); Anderson, supra note 16, at 940 (discussing the racial segregation function of
municipal boundaries); Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM.
PLANNING ASS’N 125, 126–27 (2000) (discussing exclusionary land use controls and how municipal
governments have fostered racial discrimination and exclusion through zoning).
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See McFarlane, supra note 46, at 113–18 (discussing the prioritization of the consumption needs of
the affluent and the promotion of land uses, amenities, and aesthetics in contemporary urban
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in the subordination of disfavored identity groups that are not only socially
marginalized in these processes, but for whom insufficient options are made
available through urban redevelopment’s remaking of urban spaces. This, in turn,
reduces their presence in urban spaces.109
The relative paucity of options in a low-density, yet territorially compact,
environment for favored groups to meaningfully spatially separate from disfavored
groups intensifies the nature of the social stratification existing therein.
Consequently, in mid-size regions, resettlement on the periphery of the central city
boundaries may reflect a more conscious and deliberate rejection of the central
city’s demographics than may be the case in larger regions.110
The role these sociological factors play in the making and remaking of
municipal boundaries is exacerbated by the ascendance of a general culture of mass
affluence. The sociopolitical implications of late trends in consumerism heighten
the focus on real class status as measured by perceived consumer segment
performance.111 This reinforces notions of favored and disfavored identity,
consequently defining notions of who belongs in communities in part by municipal
boundaries. The relatively constrained local economy and territorially compact
nature of mid-size regions magnifies the dynamics of this race and class
stratification, resulting in more acute social divisions than may exist in a large
metropolitan region.112 Furthermore, many of these regions are within states that
are home to sedentary family structures, meaning that an overwhelming majority of

redevelopment ventures that appeal to the sensibilities and tastes of the affluent at the expense of more
inclusive and equitable methods of land use).
109

See id.
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Large metropolitan central cities often see the very wealthy and the very poor living within the
central city while the middle class—who both cannot afford the central city’s wealthier areas and who
are fleeing any proximity to the central city’s poorer areas—are relegated to the urban fringe.
111
For a more in-depth discussion on the relationship between global consumer identity formation, mass
affluence, and urban real estate development trends, see generally McFarlane, supra note 46, at 124–28
(2009) (discussing clustering, geo-demographic profiling, and other methods of advanced marketing and
consumer segmentation that produce new forms of social and economic exclusion masked as identityneutral responses to observable, quantifiable market behavior).
112
While the author remains unaware of any available studies exploring this phenomenon, this author
draws on personal observations of the intensified race and class divisions existing in mid-size urban
settings as compared to large urban settings. In large urban settings, race and class groups have the
space to develop sizeable, self-contained and racially homogenous neighborhoods that preclude the need
to co-mingle with other groups. In the mid-size setting, however, this author’s personal observations
reveal that the relative lack of meaningful spatial separation necessitates the development of social
norms that enforce a race- or class-based social order.
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the residents are from the state.113 The higher sedentary family structure rate likely
reflects relatively low levels of in-migration, which may reflect a lack of
competitive and quality employment prospects to lure new residents in. It also adds
an inter-generational character to the social patterns that, over time, magnify the
stigmas tied to place.
Many mid-size regions’ central cities are facing declining populations and
constricting tax bases amidst rapidly complexifying geoeconomic competitive
forces.114 They risk ending up with relatively less dynamic regional economies,
which makes attracting and retaining new investments more difficult and the
consequences of failing to do so all the more dire. Because of these and other
realities, mid-size regions are considerably more exposed to the underside of global
inter-urban competition for mobile capital. The expansion of central city
boundaries is one of the most efficient methods for achieving the regional
municipal consolidation needed to spur overall regional growth and economic
competitiveness in mid-size regions.115

B.

The Mid-Size Metropolis, Economic Development and
Mobile Capital

For many mid-size central cities, property value appreciation and population
growth occur away from the central city or regional core, intensifying
fragmentation patterns.116 These mid-size central cities are disproportionately home
to their region’s neediest residents—those left behind by cycles of out-migration.
Consequently, they face the challenge of providing infrastructure and leading
regional economic development efforts while burdened by a declining tax base and
an increasingly fragmented system of metropolitan governance. While
fragmentation may not be determinative of economic competitiveness in every
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case, it can thwart the efficient development of a regional economic development
program that reflects the global intra-urban competitive landscape.117 Ultimately,
the combined force of these factors complicates regional economic development
capacity at a time of increasing global inter-urban competition.
Various studies support the contention that fragmentation is bad for
metropolitan economic development efforts. For instance, a higher number of
counties in a metropolitan region can have a negative effect on infrastructure
expenditures.118 Rusk’s Annexation and the Fiscal Fate of Cities formulates a
statistical link between fiscal health and inelastic cities—cities that are, or have in
the past been, unable to expand their boundaries over time.119 The report’s findings
support the contention that a city’s ability to annex land from its surrounding
county is one of the primary determinants of its fiscal health and that cities with
greater capacity to annex have much higher bond ratings.120
Boundary elasticity determines how well a city succeeds in maintaining its
market share of sprawling growth—a dominant factor in determining municipal
bond ratings. Rusk’s findings showed that inelastic cities are highly dependent on
state bailouts and outside financing for major regional investments. Such inelastic
cities are concentrated in the Northeastern and Midwestern states. Cities located in
states with annexation regimes that allow for high levels of boundary elasticity are
fiscally healthier and arguably more competitively positioned for economic
development success.121
Countering Rusk’s position is a long line of urban studies local government
law scholarship extolling the benefits of municipal fragmentation.122 They reflect

117

See Carruthers & Ulfarsson, supra note 1, at 316–20.

118

See, e.g., Markus Berensson, Government Fragmentation is Holding Back America’s Metropolitan
Regions, CITY MAYORS (May 3, 2011, 11:25 AM), http://www.citymayors.com/government/usgovernment-fragmentation.html; see also Markus Berensson, Metropolitan Fragmentation and
Economic Growth (Jan. 2011) (unpublished thesis) (on file with author).
119

See RUSK, supra note 15, at 2, 6. But see Edwards, supra note 14, at 133 (citing studies that call into
question the empirical evidence supporting Rusk’s prescriptions for central city decline, including
enhanced annexation powers); Mary M. Edwards & Yu Xiao, Annexation, Local Government Spending,
and the Complicating Role of Density, 45 URB. AFF. REV. 147, 162–64 (2009) (finding that the net fiscal
outcome of annexation actually depends on the relative strength of changes in both land area and
population density, holding socioeconomic and geographic variables constant).

120

See RUSK, supra note 15, at 6.

121

See id. at 7.

122

See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(arguing that metropolitan residents are essentially “consumer voters,” and that the greater the number

ANNEXATION AND THE MID-SIZE METROPOLIS
PAGE | 533

the ideology of what local government law scholar Richard Briffault has termed
“localism”: the ability of unincorporated areas to determine whether or not they
desire to be annexed purely according to localist considerations and without any
consideration of or regard for the metropolitan region as a whole.123
Proponents of intra-regional competition and local government fragmentation
underestimate ever-evolving geoeconomic realities. Their logic, if continued, will
ultimately hamstring the ability of mid-size regions to remain competitive. The
efficiency and sociological arguments in favor of greater annexation powers for
central cities are compelling and paint an empirically grounded cautionary tale for
mid-size regions.124 Mid-size central cities have to shift their scope of competition
away from localities within their regions and towards other metropolitan regions.
After almost a century of the suburban sprawl, race and class stratification,
environmentally harmful automobile dependence, and intra-regional local
government competition that localism has produced, arguments in favor of
fragmentation appear woefully short-sighted. While they contribute to a worthwhile
debate about the impact of fragmentation on the economic competitiveness of a
region, they pale in relevance to new insights about more sustainable regional
governance structures. More innovative approaches characterized as “new
regionalist” advocate for more centralized decision-making in an effort to limit
regional inequities.125
Just as metropolitanization has redefined the meaning of urban and municipal
identity, there have been concurrent shifts in the nature of economic development
and metropolitan economic growth. The globalization narrative is now widely
recognized and understood in its capacity for characterizing an array of dynamics
that have become normalized in discussions about economics, culture, law, and
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society.126 The globalization of commerce, the financialization of the global
economy, and the rise of multi-national corporations have spurred development and
investment activities unrestricted by national borders or abstract notions of
locational identity.127 This has spurred a growing attention to regional economies
and policies. The processes of globalization express themselves in social and
economic conditions of specific geographic regions, reshaping economies and
urban spaces alike.128
Companies are increasingly brokering with local governments to secure the
best deals for corporate headquarters and industrial plant locations, real estate
development projects, and other investments.129 Capital mobility encompasses an
ever-complexifying web of multi-national corporations, placeless enterprises, and
the whimsical and self-serving economic values of a global elite whose
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manipulation of technology allows them to surf the globe in search of new markets
to exploit. These entities are constantly rent-seeking for the best locational value.130
The problem of mobile capital is the problem of capital mobility and,
ultimately, capital flight.131 Capital is not always a rational actor and may remain
tied to a region because of history, relationships, or other non-economic factors. As
technology and financialization in global markets become ever more sophisticated,
however, firms will be less and less tied to any one geographic place.132
Local governments are inherently immobile, place-based enterprises that seek
to leverage their natural and developed capital to improve their quality of life.
Local government competition has traditionally been conceived of in intermunicipal, intra-regional terms that strive to resolve the relative strengths and
weaknesses between different municipal governments within a particular region.
Economist and scholar of local government Charles Tiebout is noted for his theory
that increased fragmentation and intra-regional, inter-municipal competition is
good for “consumer voters” who seek to maximize the government services they
receive while minimizing the taxes they pay.133 He and others posit that municipal
fragmentation is actually a preferable metropolitan local government organizing
strategy, as it allows individuals and firms to choose the local government that best
reflects their tastes and needs.134
Other theorists have focused on the “city powerless” theme, arguing that cities
are ultimately powerless because they cannot control either their political destiny,
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due to their status as instrumentalities of the states, or their economic destiny, due
to the nature of mobile capital.135 Unlike the mid-twentieth century geopolitical and
geoeconomic realities, however, today’s conditions see governments in a particular
region no longer able to look only inward to comprehend the challenges to growth
going forward. They must acknowledge that global inter-urban competition for
mobile capital renders the furtherance of intra-regional municipal fragmentation
counterproductive in the new competitive paradigm.136
The effect of capital attraction on metropolitan economic development
approaches presents new challenges for prevailing notions of localism in
metropolitan governance.137 The ability of metropolitan regions to collectively
offer services and develop stable tax bases is inextricably related to how they fare
in the global competition for new economic development opportunities.138
Municipal fragmentation is cumbersome for navigating today’s geopolitical and
geoeconomic realities and essentially pits localities, regions, and states against each
other.
For instance, cities like Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, exist
in the same metropolitan region.139 Over the past few years the two cities have been
engaged in what many have called a “border war,” with each state courting the
other’s businesses with relocation tax incentive packages.140 Of the fifty-three
companies that have received state tax incentives to move into Kansas since the
2009 fiscal year, forty-five have been from Missouri.141
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Similarly, South Dakota has for a long time run print and radio
advertisements in Minnesota to recruit neighboring businesses.142 The specter of
these interstate competitions reflects a disconnect between global developments in
the inter-urban competition for mobile capital and the manner in which policy
makers on the ground perceive both their role and the explanations for their
threatened or stifled economic development fortunes. Both local governments and
corporations are responding to these new realities in a manner that calls for a reexamination of long held notions of intra-regional local government relations and
the purported virtues of having many separate and autonomous local governments
within a metropolitan region.143 Municipalities within a metropolitan region can
minimize fragmentation by capitalizing on the efficiencies of more centralized
metropolitan systems of governance.144
Like metropolitanization, there is a race and class dimension to the rise of
these new geoeconomic forces. The manner in which geoeconomic forces and
economic development pressures affect local government resource allocation is
evidence of the globalization of urbanism.145 In the United States, the past three
decades have seen an increase in social stratification, impacting historically
marginalized populations and emerging disfavored identity groups. These
developments have been well documented and discussed in sociological and
geographic analyses of urban life in the past many years146 and have occurred
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concurrently with a rising anti-government backlash tied to post-Great Society and
Civil Rights Era political conservatism.147
Urban geographer Neil Smith has used the term “revanchist city” to
characterize the modern city’s embrace of authoritarian forms of social control and
considerable subsidies to corporate interests.148 Essentially, the globalization of
urbanism is reflected in the manner that capital attraction motives have influenced
local urban policy. These trends are linked to the rise of urban development
regimes overly focused on affluent development and modified measures that
facilitate segregation by economic class, real or perceived aspirational identity, and
favored or disfavored identity status. In the context of these social and economic
processes, annexation can serve as either a tool to facilitate the affluent
suburbanite’s separation or as a tool to facilitate the municipality’s maintenance of
redistributive economies and governance.149
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immigration policy, street violence against gays and homeless people, feminist-bashing, and public
campaigns against political correctness and multiculturalism. Just as the bourgeois order was perceived
as under threat by the revanchists of 1890s Paris, in 1990s New York, a particular, exclusionary vision
of “civil society” was being reinstated with a vengeance—an attempt to banish those not part of that
vision to the urban periphery. Smith expanded his revanchism theory to something common to the
restructured urban geography of the late capitalist city.
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See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 944–59.
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The urban/suburban frame fails to comprehend and adequately characterize
metropolitanization in mid-size regions, and its value diminishes even further in the
face of emerging trends in urban redevelopment, new urbanism,150 gentrification,
and the banishment of the urban poor and working poor. These economic
realignments influence land use and development patterns to focus on spaces that
fit the commodified, mass-marketed, idealized aesthetic of mixed-use (and seldom
mixed-income), master-planned community living and those spaces that do not.151
These developments have transformed the contemporary landscape of urban
development into what has been called “a highly commodified arena of urban place
production.”152
The most typical way of intensifying land use is growth, which usually
expresses itself in a constantly rising population. Cities promote their “good
business climate” attributes, which include low business taxes, a good
infrastructure of municipal services, vigorous law enforcement, an eager and docile
labor force, and a minimum of business regulations. An expanded work force and
its attendant purchasing power, in turn, lead to an expansion of retail and other
commercial activity, extensive land and housing development, and increased
financial activity. This chain of events and its consequences renders the city a
“growth machine,” and those who dominate it, members of a “growth coalition.”153
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New Urbanism is the more than twenty-year-old architectural and urban-planning movement that
advocates and promotes the development of mixed-use (and, in some cases mixed-income, but not
necessarily), walkable neighborhoods and developments that minimize automobile dependence and
wasteful land use while maximizing density, master planning, and compactness. New Urbanism has also
led the development of smart codes, which codify new urbanism principles and approaches into
implementable zoning and land-use policies. Smart codes are developed in a manner that is easily
adaptable for municipal governments. For a further discussion of new urbanism, see generally Michael
Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 257 (2006).
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See Briffault, supra note 8, at 383–90 (discussing legal and policy developments supporting
exclusionary zoning in suburban communities).
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THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES TWO DECADES LATER 6 (Andrew E.G.
Jonas & David Wilson eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE].
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The “growth machine” thesis argues that central to urban politics is land and its political, economic,
and social construction as place. The thesis focuses around coalitions of land-based elites, united around
the commodification and related economic-centric construction of the possibilities of place, who drove
urban politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth. “Growth coalition
theory” posits that city governments are, in many ways, local power structures representing an aggregate
of land-based interests that profit from the increasingly intensive use of land. Property owners see their
futures as linked together because of a common desire to increase the value of their individual parcels.
See, e.g., Scott Rogers & Milton Keynes, Urban Geography: Urban Growth Machine, in 12 INT’L
ENCYCLOPEDIA HUM. GEOGRAPHY 40, 40–45 (Rob Kitchin & Nigel Thrift eds., 2009). See JOHN R.
LOGAN & HARVEY. L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987). See
also THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE, supra note 152.
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While in many ways these dynamics have always been present in cities and are
understandable given the structure of American capitalism, recent geoeconomic
shifts have intensified their character, such that these dynamics now dominate local
political economy.154
The “growth machine” thesis reflects other critical perspectives on urban
governance and political economy that essentially mobilize urban space for
economic growth and to cater to the consumption practices and tastes of the
affluent.155 Casting these developments as entirely negative is too simplistic of an
analysis, for there are benefits and challenges presented by the new arrangements
and institutional realignments that can be managed for egalitarian purposes. For
this to occur, however, central cities must be able to expand their borders in a
manner that allows them to exercise the economic development leadership
necessary to succeed amidst the broader terrain of inter-urban competition for
mobile capital.156
Global capitalist growth and expansion—particularly for the firms that
characterize mobile capital—is tied to geographic landscapes through a process that
privileges some places, territories, and regions as sites for capital accumulation to
the detriment of others.157 These geoeconomic shifts and transformations are
altering the connections between transnational capital, social relations, and the
meaning of “community,” “urban,” and “regional.”158 Restrictive annexation
regimes can limit a city’s ability to grow, thereby making annexation policy a
concern of great significance to mid-size metropolitan regions.

154
See Schragger, supra note 8, at 491–97 (discussing the history of boosterism, growth coalitions and
the politics of capital attraction).
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See Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing Neoliberalism,”
in SPACES OF NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN RESTRUCTURING IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 2,
20–29 (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002).
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Benefits include the establishment of cooperative, business-led networks in local politics; the
mobilization of new forms of local economic development policy that foster inter-firm cooperation and
industrial clustering; the development of community-based programs to alleviate social exclusion; the
promotion of new forms of coordination and inter-organizational networking among previously distinct
spheres of local and state intervention; and the creation of new regional institutions to promote
metropolitan-wide place-marketing and intergovernmental coordination. See id. at 27.
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See id. at 2–32.
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See Smith, supra note 128, at 80–103.
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PART III: ANNEXATION IN CONTEXT: APPROACHES AND
SOLUTIONS
A central city’s boundary expansion plans not only have to contend with the
myriad of factors driving central city out-migration, but also its state’s annexation
regime. Research shows that there is a relationship between a state’s annexation
regime and the nature of annexation activity in the state.159 If taxes or race and
class dynamics have driven high-tax residents to unincorporated areas on the
central city’s periphery, the state’s annexation regime can aid the central city in
recapturing that tax base; such recapture efforts are typically the impetus for
contentious annexation battles. While these annexation battles occur frequently,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and North Carolina provide compelling examples for how
state annexation regimes can either help or hinder mid-size central cities.
These states differ considerably in both the theory of annexation they embrace
and the construction of their respective annexation regimes, but they are alike in
that they are all Southern states whose largest metropolitan regions fall within this
author’s definition of mid-size.160 Many of their regional central cities have been
actively and frequently pursuing growth objectives that include or are dependent
upon annexation.161
Size matters for the mid-size central cities of these states. They have
expanded through previous annexations and, in many cases, have tested their
states’ annexation laws through prolonged, intense boundary disputes. While
metropolitanization has forged strong regional identities, opposition to annexation
persists. What mediates the impact of this annexation backlash is the relative
sophistication of the state’s respective annexation regime. For Jackson, Mississippi,
the state’s annexation policy has effectively stifled its expansion. Tennessee’s
annexation regime includes a land use policy with meaningful protections of
central cities. North Carolina’s annexation regime has arguably fueled the
considerable economic development successes of metropolitan regions throughout
the state.
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See Edwards, supra note 14, at 125–27.
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The population numbers and rankings for the mid-size MSAs of the three states are: Charlotte, North
Carolina (1.7 million; 33); Nashville, Tennessee (1.59 million; 38); Memphis, Tennessee (1.3 million;
41); Raleigh, North Carolina (1.13 million; 48); Greensboro, North Carolina (723,801; 71); Knoxville,
Tennessee (698,030; 75); Jackson, Mississippi (539,057; 96); Chattanooga, Tennessee (528,143; 97) and
Durham, North Carolina (504,357; 102). See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79.
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See generally Rice, supra note 53.
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A.

Mississippi

Disputes over the expansion of Mississippi’s largest city, Jackson, illustrate
the challenges mid-size central cities face in resolving weak state annexation
regimes with the need for boundary expansion. Jackson is the ninety-sixth largest
metropolitan region in the nation and grew 8.42% between 2000 and 2010.162 It is
the largest metropolitan region in the state of Mississippi and is the state capital.
Jackson is characteristic of many mid-size regions. Its land use patterns are
characterized by low to moderate-density development over a relatively territorially
compact urbanized area with a patchwork of suburbs and rural development on the
periphery. The urban form is dominated by the roadways and parking lots that
facilitate automobile movement within and through the region. Race and class
dynamics reflect high levels of stratification, while attractive options for white and
middle-class flight outside of the central city largely consist of neighborhoodcentric residential development with supporting retail and commercial
developments in a rural or light-suburban setting.
The recently incorporated town of Byram, Mississippi, lies immediately on
Jackson’s southern boundary.163 For more than ten years, Byram was embroiled in
legal battles with Jackson regarding its annexation and incorporation.164 The first
round occurred in the 1990s when Byram successfully defeated an attempted
annexation of its area. The case of In re Enlargement and Extension of the
Municipal Boundaries of Jackson (Byram I)165 arose out of Jackson’s attempted
annexation of 24.25 square miles of unincorporated territory that included
Byram.166 Pursuant to the state’s annexation policy, the Jackson City Council
adopted an ordinance approving the annexation, the petition was filed in the
Chancery Court, and final judgment was rendered in favor of the City of
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State of Metropolitan America Indicator Map, BROOKINGS INST., www.brookings.edu/metro/
StateOfMetroAmerica/Map.aspx# (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
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See Cheryl Lasseter, Byram Is Soon To Be an Incorporated City, WBLT (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://www.wlbt.com/global/story.asp?s=10129297.
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See, e.g., Elizabeth Kirkland, Byram Community Seeking Incorporation Again, MISS. BUS. J.,
May 28, 2001, at 15.
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691 So. 2d 978 (Miss. 1997).

166

See id. at 979.
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Jackson.167 The action was approved by the lower court but ultimately overturned
by the Mississippi Supreme Court.168
Jackson’s ability to annex the Byram area was greatly limited by
Mississippi’s annexation regime. Mississippi’s statutes relating to municipalities
contain no policy statements on the role of annexation and incorporation in landuse planning.169 Procedurally, Mississippi allows for a municipality seeking to
annex unincorporated lands to initiate the matter in its governing body. If passed,
the municipality must present the petition to the Chancery Court of its county.170
The statute provides that the Chancery Court should ratify the petition if the
annexation is reasonable and is required by public convenience and necessity.171
Under Mississippi law the courts are charged with assessing the reasonableness of a
municipality’s decision to annex unincorporated property.172 Mississippi courts
have determined that annexation is reasonable only if it is fair and that, in making
this determination, annexation must be viewed from the perspective of both the city
and the landowners of the proposed annexation area.173
Mississippi courts have established twelve indicia against which the
reasonableness of a particular annexation proposal is judged.174 The courts consider
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See id.
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See id. at 979–80.
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See MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-1-27 (2011).
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See id. § 21-1-29.
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See id. § 21-1-33 (“If the chancellor finds from the evidence presented at such hearing that the
proposed enlargement or contraction is reasonable and is required by the public convenience and
necessity and, in the event of an enlargement of a municipality, that reasonable public and municipal
services will be rendered in the annexed territory within a reasonable time, the chancellor shall enter a
decree approving, ratifying and confirming the proposed enlargement or contraction, and describing the
boundaries of the municipality as altered.”).
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See City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators, 16 So. 3d 662, 672 (Miss. 2009) (“The authority to
initiate such [annexation] proceedings rests with the governing authorities of such municipality.”).
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See generally Byram I, 691 So. 2d 978.

See, e.g., id. at 980 (citing In re Extension of the Boundaries of Jackson, 551 So. 2d 861, 864 (Miss.
1989)). The twelve indicia of reasonableness are (1) the municipality’s need to expand; (2) whether the
area sought to be annexed is reasonably within a path of growth of the city; (3) potential health hazards
from sewage and waste disposal in the annexed areas; (4) the municipality’s financial ability to make the
improvements and furnish municipal services promised; (5) need for zoning and overall planning in the
areas; (6) need for municipal services in the areas sought to be annexed; (7) whether there are natural
barriers between the city and the proposed annexation area; (8) past performance and time element
involved in the city’s provision of services to its present residents; (9) economic or other impact of the
annexation upon those who live in or own property in the proposed annexation area; (10) impact of the
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these factors under a totality of the circumstances analysis that limits the ability of
any one factor to be considered separately or independently of the others.175 In
Byram I, Jackson framed its argument in regionalist terms by contending that the
fate of the region was directly tied to the success of its central city, Jackson. It
argued that a decline in its general welfare, quality of life, or economic
development potential would have an adverse effect not only on Jackson but on the
entire metropolitan region.176 Additionally, the city argued that it needed to expand
its tax base to deal with declining real property values and stagnant municipal tax
revenue.177 The lower court was sympathetic to this position, holding that as the
economic, governmental, and cultural center of the state, Jackson’s continued
economic well-being is important to the central portion of Mississippi and the
entire state.178 The lower court’s conception of reasonableness incorporated an
analysis of the economic development impact on the region as opposed to just a
narrow consideration of the localist concerns of the Byram residents.
The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed, however, and sided with Byram
area residents rather than Jackson’s growth and economic development realities.
Ultimately, the Mississippi Supreme Court deemed the annexation a “tax grab,”
unreasonable and unfair to the residents of the proposed annexation area.179 In a
dissenting opinion, however, state Supreme Court Judge Prather defended
Jackson’s position and built upon the lower court’s argument for a regionalist
frame in applying the court’s reasonableness standard.
Judge Prather recognized the importance of Jackson to the region and that its
decline would have an adverse effect on the entire metropolitan region, including
the proposed annexation area.180 His dissent displayed a keen awareness of the
irony present in the Byram residents’ arguments, stating, “I find it ironic that

annexation upon the voting strength of protected minority groups; (11) whether the property owners and
other inhabitants of the areas sought to be annexed have in the past, and in the foreseeable future unless
annexed will, because of their reasonable proximity to the corporate limits of the municipality, enjoy
economic and social benefits of the municipality without paying their fair share of taxes; and (12) any
other factors that may suggest reasonableness. Id. at 980.
175

See, e.g., Magnolia Marine Transp. v. City of Vicksburg, 560 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1990).
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See Byram I, 691 So. 2d at 983.
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See id. at 984 (Prather, J., dissenting).

178

See id. at 988 (Prather, J., dissenting).
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See id. (Prather, J., dissenting).
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See id. at 990 (Prather, J., dissenting).
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representatives of areas which have grown largely out of a desire to avoid taxation
for the services which they enjoy in City of Jackson should accuse the City of
attempting a ‘tax grab’ out of considerations of greed.”181 Judge Prather reminded
the court that it was departing from its previously expressed concerns for the
regional impacts of Jackson’s decline. In the earlier case of In re Extension of
Boundaries of Jackson,182 the Mississippi Supreme Court found in favor of
Jackson’s annexation proposal by interpreting Jackson’s long-range growth
prospects as fitting the definition of its first index of reasonableness: the
municipality’s need to expand.183 Judge Prather included in his dissent the court’s
statement in that case that
Jackson’s need for an expanded tax base is reasonable as well. As a matter of
fact, recent years reflect a gradual recession of Jackson’s (economic) life blood
to the various surrounding communities. These communities have experienced
meteoric growth, most of them with a planned development. They have drained
off and continue to drain off the life of the city’s flow of wealth in people,
culture and dollars. Indeed, the very statistics recited by the Court below are the
product of the flight of so many persons from Jackson’s corporate limits, not so
far as to deprive themselves of full access to the economic, social and cultural
benefits Jackson has to offer but only so far as to sever their relationship with
Jackson’s assessor and tax collector. Barring a wholly unanticipated act of
altruism by Ridgeland, Madison, Flowood, Pearl, Richland, Florence or
Clinton—not to mention unincorporated western Rankin County, Jackson faces
the certainty of a slow but sure erosion of its tax base by the unilateral actions of
these selfish former citizens.184

The Byram residents had legitimate concerns about Jackson’s ability to
manage service delivery in the area proposed for annexation. The testimony
presented in the case revealed that Jackson had arguably underperformed in the
management of its resources.185 Jackson’s image as being worthy of the right to
annex additional areas was also dogged by its past failure to furnish promised
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See id. at 988–89.
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551 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1989).
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See id. at 865.
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See Byram I, 691 So. 2d at 988 (Pranther, J., dissenting).
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See id. at 984 (discussing the testimony of the objectors’ expert who testified that the case
represented the only instance where he found a county level of service in terms of street and right-ofway maintenance that was noticeably better than that within the city).
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improvements to areas annexed in 1976 and 1989.186 Several objective criticisms of
Jackson’s ability to service additional areas were presented, and a common thread
in state annexation regimes is the requirement that the annexing municipality be
capable of extending its infrastructure and public services into an annexed area.187
But service delivery concerns are incidental to broader considerations of regional
interdependence and a social construction of municipal boundaries that ultimately
pits communities within a region against each other.
The 1997 Byram case was act one in the saga for Jackson’s expansion. In
2009, the Mississippi Supreme Court again addressed the issue of Jackson’s
expansion into the Byram area in City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators (Byram
II).188 The matter involved the combined case of the incorporation petition of the
Byram area residents and another annexation petition by the City of Jackson. The
“Byram Incorporators,” as the court referred to them, were attempting to
incorporate Byram at the same time as Jackson was trying again to annex an area
that included Byram. With regard to the annexation petition, the court again looked
to its twelve indicia of reasonableness, considering each of them individually. The
first factor is the city’s need for expansion.189 Within this specific category, the
court has enumerated additional factors for consideration, including spillover
development into the proposed annexation area, the municipality’s internal growth,
the need to expand the municipality’s tax base, and limitations due to geography
and environmental influences, among others.190
Jackson asserted that its 2002 population density of 1,724.27 residents per
square mile was high in relation to other Southern cities and that it only had fifteen
to twenty percent vacant, developable land within its city limits.191 The court’s
consideration of the city’s need to expand involved judgments on whether the city’s
density afforded it enough land for future growth and whether the need for
increased tax revenues was proportional to the size of the area the city sought to
annex.192 Based on this analysis, the court upheld the lower court’s reduction in the
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See id.
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See id.
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16 So. 3d 662, 672 (Miss. 2009).
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See id. at 684–85.
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proposed area for annexation to what it considered to be in direct proportion with
the city’s need to expand.193
It is likely that Jackson’s arguments in the case limited the court’s
consideration of the more significant growth considerations the court had
previously acknowledged.194 Jackson’s arguments were more inwardly focused;
they failed to adequately communicate the city’s position within a larger
metropolitan region or the challenges its mid-size status presents for future
economic development endeavors. Jackson argued that it was too dense, an
argument that runs counter to the anti-sprawl logic that would also oppose regional
fragmentation.195 While the city’s relative density is certainly informative for
understanding land use patterns, it is less relevant in assessing how boundary
expansion will enhance the economic health and competitive profile of not just
Jackson, but the entire region. The city’s need for increased revenue is a more
useful measurement, but even this factor requires context to have an impact. If the
“need for increased revenue” justification for annexation is viewed in a zero-sum
light where, in order for the city to win, the proposed area for annexation must lose,
it loses its persuasiveness given the cultural draw of local autonomy in local
government law.
The “need for increased revenue” justification for annexation must be viewed
in regionalist terms, which recasts annexation as a win-win scenario in which the
annexed area benefits from the improved economic position of the central city. The
court’s analysis in both cases fails to conceptualize Jackson as the economic
development anchor for the areas both within and outside its borders. The court
seems committed to viewing the factors impacting Jackson’s fate as being
contained by its municipal boundaries as opposed to spilling over into the
metropolitan region.
Considering the judiciary’s primary function of dispute resolution within the
context of the facts of a particular controversy, broader questions about urban
policy and the externalities associated with municipal boundary reformations
should be determined by the legislature. With no guiding philosophy on the role of
local government expansion as related to a broader urban policy concern,
Mississippi has abdicated these important urban policy and economic development
matters to the litigation process. Of the twelve indicia of reasonableness the
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See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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See Byram II, 16 So. 3d at 684.
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Mississippi court deploys in reviewing challenges to municipal annexation, none of
them directly addresses the prosperity of the metropolitan region.
Recently, Jackson and Byram’s home county, Hinds County, embarked on a
county-wide economic development marketing effort geared toward promoting the
county as a whole.196 Developments like these signal that the Jackson metropolitan
regional stakeholders are aware of their interdependence. In its 2010 annual report,
Jackson reported a Moody’s bond rating of Aa2, which is relatively high.197 This
strong financial indicator, in light of past boundary issues, runs contrary to Rusk’s
thesis. It is likely, however, that Jackson’s relatively low regional growth rate
between the 2000 and 2010 census reflects the consequences of entrenched
fragmentation.198

B.

Tennessee

Tennessee’s annexation statute differs considerably from Mississippi’s in both
its procedural development and its expression of the role of annexation in
municipal economic health and growth. Tennessee’s annexation statute provides, in
relevant part, that an annexation will be deemed necessary not only when a
majority of residents and property owners in the affected area present a petition, but
also when it appears the “prosperity of the municipality will be materially retarded”
without the annexation.199 This choice of statutory language implicitly recognizes
the need for cities to expand and privileges those needs in a manner that could
potentially outrank the will of private individuals to remain outside a particular
city’s boundaries. This disposition bodes well for the cities and mid-size regions
like Memphis and Nashville that are, to varying degrees, globally recognized for
their cultural and historical assets but are still vying for competitive positioning
with larger regions.200
Tennessee’s annexation statute explicitly favors the growth of its largest
municipalities by affording them priority in annexation contests. Where two
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See Ruth Ingram, Marketing Message Unveiled for Hinds, CLARION LEDGER, July 22, 2011, at B1.
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See CITY OF JACKSON, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 2010, at iv (2010).
198

See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-102 (2011).
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For a general resource on Tennessee’s economic development strivings, see G. Mark Mamantov,
Abating Property Taxes in Tennessee: An Essential Tool in the Economic Development Toolbox, 4
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 89 (2003) (discussing methods of economic development within
Tennessee).
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municipalities incorporated in the same county seek to annex the same territory, the
proceedings of the municipality having the larger population will have precedence
and the smaller municipality’s proceedings will be held in abeyance pending the
outcome of the proceedings of the larger municipality.201 Essentially, size matters
in Tennessee’s annexation regime, and the state has determined that it wants to
privilege those municipalities that, by virtue of scale, are likely best suited for
continued growth and expansion.
Tennessee’s current annexation statute is the result of the invalidation of a
1997 annexation law that made it easier for small towns located on the urban fringe
areas adjacent to larger cities to incorporate themselves rather than be annexed by
the region’s central city.202 The 1997 law was struck down by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Tennessee Municipal League v. Thompson,203 after which the
state legislature created a committee to rewrite the annexation law.204 The new
annexation statute was hailed as a progressive step forward.205 It resulted in a
broader Growth Management Law that had as its stated purpose “to direct the
coordinated, efficient and orderly development of the local government and its
environs that will, based on an analysis of present and future needs, best promote
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.”206 The Growth Management
Law (commonly referred to as the “Growth Policy Act”) directs each city and
county to determine an urban growth boundary to guide its development.207
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See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-110(b).
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See 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 98; Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333, 334–35 (Tenn.
1997) (discussing the background and construction of the annexation statute); Michael J. Stewart,
Growth and Its Implications: An Evaluation of Tennessee’s Growth Management Plan, 67 TENN. L.
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One of the aims of the Growth Policy Act is to eliminate the incorporation of
unincorporated areas driven by the fear of being annexed by the central city, or
what is known as defensive incorporation.208 Under the Growth Policy Act, a
municipality possesses exclusive authority to annex territory located within its
approved urban growth boundaries; therefore, no municipality may annex by
ordinance or referendum any territory located within another municipality’s
approved urban growth boundaries.209 The combined effect of Tennessee’s
annexation statute and its Growth Policy Act statue incentivizes urban growth
planning by tying a municipality’s annexation powers to the development of its
growth plan.210
Tennessee’s regard for the growth and prosperity of its municipalities is not
only codified in the statutory language, but also in Tennessee courts’ interpretations
of the annexation statute. Tennessee courts recognize a fairly limited level of
judicial review in annexation cases, holding that annexation is a legislative matter
that will not be disturbed by the court on review unless the legislative will can be
shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable.211 In assessing whether an annexation is
reasonable, Tennessee courts have acknowledged that there are always advantages
and disadvantages to annexation, but ultimately if the court finds the advantages
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See id. § 6-58-102(1)-(5). For a broader discussion of defensive incorporation, see Garnett, supra
note 125, at 285–87.
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when the method of annexation is by adoption of an ordinance but make no provision for court review
when annexation is by referendum. Presumably, the legislature recognized that the citizens of the
territory being annexed had no right of action in one method and did have a right to action in the other
. . . . The court is of the opinion that there can be no judicial review of plaintiffs’ suit under T.C.A. 6-51103 (the reasonableness test) as such procedures only apply to annexation by ordinance cases. However,
the court finds that the allegations of the complaint averring constitutional defects and infirmities in the
adoption of the resolution and/or the election by referendum is reviewable.”).
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and disadvantages of the annexation to be debatable, then it must rule in its
favor.212
In State ex rel. Collier v. Pigeon Forge,213 a case challenging the
reasonableness of an annexation ordinance, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
the applicable test for determining whether an annexation is proper requires the
consideration of all factors with the primary focus being on whether the ordinance
was reasonable for the planned and orderly growth of the city.214 Pigeon Forge
involved the annexation of an area lying in the growth pattern of Pigeon Forge, a
small tourist-oriented city located in the foothills of the Smoky Mountains thirty
miles Southeast of Knoxville.215 Pigeon Forge is several miles south of Sevierville,
which is considered part of the Knoxville metropolitan region, the seventy-fifth
largest MSA.216
In reviewing the Pigeon Forge annexation, the court took into consideration
its justifications for expansion, namely the need to guard against a “helter-skelter”
development of commercial activities that may not be in harmony with those
already in operation.217 The court even went so far as to state that the failure of a
city to extend its corporate boundaries to embrace contiguous areas of growth and
development is an abdication of its responsibility.218 In arriving at its decision to
uphold the annexation, the court reviewed its previous statements on its theory of
annexation. The court reaffirmed its contention that the appropriate theory of
annexation recognizes it as a device by which a municipality may plan for its
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See, e.g., State ex rel. Hicks, 513 S.W.2d 780 at 783.
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599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980).
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See id. at 548.
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See id. at 546.
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See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79. While Pigeon Forge is likely considered to be
within the official Knoxville metropolitan statistical area, the Pigeon Forge case casts it as the “central
city,” in the parlance of this article.
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State of Tenn. ex rel. Collier, 599 S.W.2d at 547.

See id. (“[Annexation] has a vital concern in guarding against the helter-skelter establishment of
commercial activities that may not be in harmony with those already in operation. Indeed, the
prevention of incompatible commercial enterprises is a high municipal duty. The failure of a city to
extend its corporate boundaries to embrace contiguous areas of growth and development is an abdication
of responsibility. The time to annex is in the incipient stage of growth, lest the basic purpose of
annexation be frustrated and the public interest suffer by the annexation of substandard areas.”).
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orderly growth and development in a manner that “gives the city some control over
its destiny.”219
Tennessee courts have wrestled with challenges to the legitimacy of
annexation efforts brought by those living in areas proposed for annexation. While
Memphis, Tennessee, is neither the state’s capital nor its largest metropolitan
region, it is arguably the state’s most renowned and symbolic metropolitan
region.220 Memphis ranks second in population behind Nashville, the MSAs
ranking numbers forty-one and thirty-eight, respectively.221 In Vollmer v.
Memphis,222 the Tennessee Supreme Court’s reasonableness analysis incorporated
factors affecting both the welfare of the affected residents and property owners, as
well as the welfare of the municipality as a whole.223
Vollmer involved a challenge to the reasonableness and constitutionality of an
annexation ordinance brought by residents living in the area proposed for
annexation.224 The court recognized that the annexation would place the affected
citizens of the area on the tax rolls of Memphis, allowing them to pay for services
they enjoy without cost, including parks, libraries, and public facilities financed
and provided by the city.225 The court also took into consideration that the great
majority of the residents in the affected area were employed in Memphis and
commuted to Memphis in automobiles which did not then meet the emission
standards required of automobiles owned by Memphis residents, surmising that
compliance with the higher Memphis standards would ensure cleaner air for
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See id. (citing City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enters., 562 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tenn. 1978)).
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Located on the Mississippi River, Memphis is internationally renowned as the home of Graceland,
Elvis Presley’s estate, and the Lorraine Motel, the site of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination.
The city is also well known for its cultivation of blues music. For more information on Memphis’s
history and symbolic importance, see History of Memphis, CITY OF MEMPHIS,
http://www.cityofmemphis.org/framework.aspx?page=296 (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
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See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A) (2011) (“Any aggrieved owner of property that borders
or lies within territory that is the subject of an annexation ordinance prior to the operative date thereof,
may file a suit in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding in accordance with this part, § 6-51-301 and
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Vollmer, 792 S.W.2d at 449.
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citizens of the entire region.226 The court concluded its reasonableness analysis by
stating that its concern for the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and
property owners of the area also included the citizens and property owners residing
in the city of Memphis.227
While the court in Byram II considered many of the same factors in
evaluating the City of Jackson’s attempted annexation of the Byram area, it was
constrained by a very thin annexation regime and common-law lineage which
lacked any meaningful consideration of the impact of boundary reformations on
regional prosperity. Tennessee’s annexation statute codifies the importance of
annexation as urban policy in the plain language of the statute and creates parity
between safeguards for citizens and municipalities. While Tennessee’s annexation
regime is fairly open to interpretation by the courts, the courts themselves have
adopted common-law standards that afford considerable deference to the express
language in the enabling statutes.

C.

North Carolina

North Carolina’s annexation regime has historically been hailed by many as a
model urban policy that has contributed to the growth and economic development
of its municipalities during the second half of the twentieth century.228 It is possible
to connect the economic viability and attractiveness of North Carolina’s several
dynamic metropolitan regions with its annexation law.229 The state’s annexation
statute has its roots in the Municipal Government Study Commission, which was
formed in 1958 in response to the concerns of the state’s leading municipalities.
The Commission’s initial report declared that the periodic extension of municipal
boundaries was essential for strong municipalities and the delivery of public
services.230 The Commission declared that “cities cannot continue to remain strong
and provide essential municipal services for sound development unless their
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See, e.g., RUSK, supra note 15; Rob Christensen, Many Hail North Carolina Annexation Law,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/03/27/1085023/many-hailncs-annexation-law.html.
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boundaries are periodically extended to take in those areas which require municipal
services for sound development.”231
North Carolina’s annexation statute contains two “Declaration of Policy”
statements which communicate the values undergirding the state’s approach to
municipal annexation for communities above and below the 5,000 population
mark.232 The declaration specifically addresses metropolitan sprawl by plainly
stating that sound urban development is essential to the continued economic
development of North Carolina.233 For the state’s smaller municipalities, the statute
states,
[N]ew urban development in and around municipalities having a population of
less than 5,000 persons tends to be concentrated close to the municipal boundary
rather than being scattered and dispersed as in the vicinity of larger
municipalities, so that the legislative standards governing annexation by smaller
municipalities can be simpler than those for larger municipalities . . . .234

For the state’s larger municipalities, the statute states,
[N]ew urban development in and around municipalities having a population of
5,000 or more persons is more scattered than in and around smaller
municipalities, and that such larger municipalities have a greater difficulty in
expanding municipal utility systems and other service facilities to serve such
scattered development, so that the legislative standards governing annexation by
larger municipalities must take these facts into account if the objectives set forth
in this section are to be obtained.235

The statute’s careful classification of small towns and large or growing
municipalities exhibits a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between
boundary expansion and urban development than that of Mississippi or Tennessee.
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See id. (citing Report of Municipal Government Study Commission (1958), reprinted in SELECTED
MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 41 (Jake Wicker ed., 1980)).
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See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33, 160A-45 (2011).
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North Carolina’s statute gives broad authority to municipalities to extend their
corporate limits to include contiguous and non-contiguous areas provided they are
capable of providing public services to the annexed area in substantially the same
manner as they are provided to the rest of the municipality.236 Previously, the
statute specifically focused on the annexation of areas developed for “urban
purposes.”237 Areas developed for “urban purposes” were defined according to
specific characteristics such as density, spatial ordering, and intensity of
subdivision, land use, and infrastructure support. North Carolina courts have held
that for proposed annexations, the test for compliance is whether the proposed
annexation “substantially complies” with the statute; literal compliance is not
required.238
Up and until the changes enacted in the 2012 legislative session, North
Carolina provided for both voluntary and involuntary annexations.239 The state’s
involuntary annexation provisions are credited for the policy’s success but also
ignited a significant backlash.240 Involuntary annexation was only afforded to
municipalities with more than 5000 residents.241 North Carolina courts adjudicating
involuntary annexation disputes have long emphasized that in an involuntary
annexation, municipal services must be extended to annexed areas in a

236

See id. § 160A-46; Davidson Cnty. v. High Point, 362 S.E.2d 553, 558 (N.C. 1987) (“A city, on the
other hand, has statutory authority to annex areas both contiguous and noncontiguous to its primary
corporate limits. It must stand ready to provide sewer service (among other services) to newly annexed
areas on substantially the same basis and in the same manner in which these services are provided to the
rest of the city.”).
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See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(c) (2010).
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See Briggs v. City of Asheville, 583 S.E.2d 733, 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (citing In re New Bern,
180 S.E.2d 851, 856 (1971)).
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See An Act to Require a Vote of the Residents Prior to the Adoption of an Annexation Ordinance
Initiated by a Municipality, H.B. 925, 2011 N.C. SESS. LAWS 2012-11; Gary D. Robertson, NC
Governor Won’t Block Forced Annexation Changes, S.F. CHRON., June 10, 2012, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/NC-governor-won-t-block-forced-annexation-changes3623182.php.
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Voluntary annexations are initiated by the petition of the landowners requesting that their land be
annexed into a municipality. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31(a) (2011) (“The governing board of any
municipality may annex by ordinance any area contiguous to its boundaries upon presentation to the
governing board of a petition signed by the owners of all the real property located within such area. The
petition shall be signed by each owner of real property in the area and shall contain the address of each
such owner.”).
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municipality under the procedure set forth in this Part.”).
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nondiscriminatory manner, meaning that annexed residents and property owners
must receive substantially the same services that existing municipal residents and
property owners receive.242
Involuntary annexations were always required to satisfy specific requirements
to prevent against arbitrariness annexations.243 The state’s careful consideration of
granting municipalities unilateral power was evident in its urban-use-andsubdivision test—an essential component of its former involuntary annexation
provisions. The requirements stated that sixty percent of the property proposed for
an involuntary annexation “must be developed for urban purposes.”244 It allowed
non-urban land to be annexed as well, provided that it (1) laid between the
municipal boundary and an area developed for urban purposes so that the area
developed for urban purposes is either not adjacent to the municipal boundary or
cannot be served by the municipality without extending services through a sparsely
developed area, or (2) was adjacent, on at least sixty percent of its external
boundary, to any combination of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an
area or areas developed for urban purposes.245
While North Carolina is generally comprised of small cities and towns—
where most annexations occur—it has several mid-size regions. The Charlotte and
Raleigh MSAs exceed one million in population, but neither exceeds two
million.246 Neither of these areas has seen the level of annexation litigation that the
Asheville MSA has. Over the past fifteen years, at least seven cases involving
disputes over involuntary annexation proceedings have been litigated in North
Carolina courts, and of these cases, only one involved a city other than
Asheville.247
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City of Asheville, 583 S.E.2d 733 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Ridgefield Props. v. City of Asheville, 583
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The Asheville MSA ranks 117 with a 2010 population of 424,858 and grew
more than fifteen percent between the 2000 and 2010 census.248 Asheville’s tax
base grew 3.5% during the last quarter of 2009, which was credited mostly to
annexations.249 Carolina Light & Power Co. v. City of Asheville250 illustrates how
the state statute’s guiding intent plays out in annexation challenges. The case
involved a dispute over whether lands lying between the municipality and the
urbanized areas sought for development fell within the exception for annexing unurbanized lands articulated in the statute.251
In explaining its reasoning, the court found that the legislative intent of the
statute was to allow municipalities the opportunity to extend their services to reach
urban core areas without being thwarted by intervening undeveloped land.252
Involuntary annexation and the urban-use-and-subdivision test operationalized this
intent. They ensured that central cities were able to quickly respond to growth
patterns in a manner that protects their ability to maximize their quality of life and
economic development prospects, with the recognition that as these factors
improve for the central city, the entire metropolitan region benefits.
North Carolina’s annexation statute specifically limits the scope of judicial
review in annexation cases. State courts have acknowledged judicial review as
being restricted to addressing whether the municipality followed statutory
procedures and, if not, whether those in the annexed area will suffer material
injury, and whether the annexed area meets statutory requirements.253 In spite of
this, some courts have gone beyond addressing procedural disputes and ventured
into interpreting statutory provisions.254
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North Carolina’s involuntary annexation statutory provisions have caused
considerable controversy, specifically because they are the most pro-municipality
of such provisions among states that allow for involuntary annexation.255 After
years of political battles over involuntary annexation, on June 18, 2011, the North
Carolina legislature ratified House Bill 845, entitled “An Act to Reform the
Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina.”256 The legislation weakened the
state’s annexation regime by allowing a majority of property owners in an annexed
area to deliver a petition to the municipality’s governing board challenging the
annexation. Additional changes followed in the 2012 legislative session. North
Carolina House Bill 925 became law when the Governor refused to sign or veto the
measure after the session.257 The legislation changed the annexation process to a
referendum vote of the annexation area, effectively ending involuntary annexation
in North Carolina.
These developments are the culmination of a protracted fight to end
involuntary annexation. The communities fighting involuntary annexation were
wealthy, predominately white communities comprised of individuals who fled the
central cities to live on their close-in periphery.258 While there are certainly a range

on N.C.G.S. § 160A-33 to add a gloss to N.C.G.S. § 160A-35(3) to require that the annexing
municipality provide public services that exceed to a ‘meaningful’ degree the services the area to be
annexed is already receiving.”).
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For instance, the Biltmore Lake Community Action Committee, a neighborhood group formed
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of motivations for relocating, the previously referenced history of metropolitan
settlement patterns suggest that race and class likely played a role in motivating
those in staunch opposition to involuntary annexation in North Carolina.259 The
backlash provides yet another window into the race and class dynamics associated
with the social construction of boundaries.
It is important to note that race and class-based criticisms do not always cut in
favor of involuntary annexation. Some argue that involuntary annexation results in
bottom-line approaches that favor the annexation of wealthy areas while
overlooking poorer areas where the cost to extend municipal services would exceed
the amount of tax revenues received.260 While “cherry-picking” annexation should
be restricted, it should not be used in a fashion that undermines the involuntary
annexation regime entirely. By allowing municipalities to recapture wealthy outmigration, it serves a redistributive function that ultimately benefits poorer
residents.
North Carolina’s metropolitan regions have grown and experienced economic
development success during the period since the enactment of its progressive
annexation regime. Between 1960 and 2010, the Raleigh MSA saw its population
more than triple. Neighboring state capitals, however, did not see similar growth.
Columbia, South Carolina, had a slight increase, while Richmond, Virginia, shrank.
Those cities are significantly smaller than Raleigh, and their residents are poorer,
based on personal income data.261 Additionally, Raleigh, Cary, Durham, Chapel
Hill, Greensboro, High Point, Winston-Salem, and Charlotte have all earned the
highest AAA bond ratings.262

D. Annexation Lessons
Involuntary annexation is what made North Carolina’s annexation regime a
model for the nation. Tennessee benefits from a comprehensive urban growth
boundary approach that privileges central cities in the annexation process. Both
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states have better performing mid-size metropolitan regions than Mississippi,
which lacks any comparable urban growth policy.
State annexation regimes should include preferential treatment for mid-size
central cities that risk being landlocked due to municipal incorporations on their
peripheries. Such qualifications should take into consideration the metropolitan
region’s population and demographic distribution, a relative assessment of the
suburban incorporation threat in the region, the degree of social stratification, and
how central city boundary expansion would meaningfully and measurably alter the
economic development prospects for the metropolitan region.
The effects of metropolitanization and its redefinition of the metropolis
suggest that metropolitan residents may not be concerned with the municipal subunit within which they reside. Therefore, annexation policy should seek to sever
residential and political identities by reconstructing the legal geography of the
metropolis.263 This has the potential to resolve both the external challenges of
attracting economic development opportunities with the internal challenges of
reducing social stratification.
In addition to allowing for features such as involuntary annexation, a procentral city annexation regime must include clear, unambiguous policy positions on
annexation as urban policy. Of the three, only Tennessee and North Carolina avow
annexation’s role in ensuring prosperity, sound urban development, and curbing the
effects of urban sprawl. Mississippi’s lack of an express urban policy focus in its
annexation regime renders it at a significant disadvantage to its regional neighbors.

CONCLUSION
None of the challenges facing the modern American metropolis can be
addressed on a municipality-by-municipality basis. Mid-size metropolitan regions
are more acutely affected by increased intra-regional fragmentation and the
corresponding lack of intra-regional economic development cooperation it can
produce. In order to be competitive, metropolitan regions must leverage their
strengths, maximize their economies of scale, and merge their assets into a unified
regional economic and political unit. Therefore, the central cities of mid-size
regions need annexation regimes that prioritize the elasticity of their boundaries
and allow them to thwart fragmentation and the challenges it poses for the region’s
competitiveness.
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Annexation is certainly not a cure-all for the challenges facing mid-size
regions. To the extent that a range of approaches is needed, annexation can be used
as a short-term stopgap that will allow mid-size central cities the ability to stabilize
their tax bases while making longer-term investments in creating meaningful, more
robust regional governance structures.

